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Abstract
The dissertation consists of two essays.
The first essay studies governance structures and their effectiveness for start-up companies and
their survival. We utilize data from the Kauffman Survey, which tracks a sample of firms from
their inceptions through their first eight years of existence. We hypothesize and find evidence
that a startup's governance system affects its survivability as well as its performance. We show
that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the performance
of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables; the presence of one or more
independent board member on the board, the separation between the person holding the CEO
position and the chair of the board. From the startup survival perspective, we show that the
presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between CEO and board
chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up's longevity.
The second essay studies the direct and indirect relations between Governance and firm survival
and performance through Entrepreneurial Orientation. Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is
defined as the attributes, including innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking attitude,
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness, that a business organization displays at the time
of entry. Several researchers have studied the linkage between EO and organizational
performance as well as the survival rate of new firms and find conflicting results. Reasons for the
contradictory results might very well be the way the researchers have defined the EO attributes
and the data source they use which is based on subjective responses. In the hopes of reducing
inconsistent results, we propose that it is the governance factors that influence the performance
and survival of these firm via mediating role of entrepreneurial orientation. Governance factors
remove the definition as well as data measurement problems. By using the 8-year longitudinal
data of 4928 startups, we show that governance system significantly impacts a start-up’s
performance and survival via entrepreneurial orientation.
JEL Classification: M13, L26, G34

Keywords: Entrepreneurial Finance; Privately-held Companies; Governance Structure; Start-up
survival; Entrepreneurial Orientation; Startup Performance.
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CHAPTER 1
Governance Structure and the Startup survival

1.

Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a privately-held firm managed by a single owner
will not face agency costs because the conflicts of interest between the owner and the manager do
not exist. Although a private firm is more vulnerable when it is owned by multiple owner and
managers, the problem can be resolved efficiently as the owners practice economically more
rational behavior. Thus, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the formal governance
mechanism of a private firm is not only unnecessary but may detract the firm from having
efficient performance. According to Uhlaner, Wright, and Huse (2007), the shift from the founderowner managed ﬁrm to a multiple ownership structure in most cases will result in immediate
demands for more monitoring which in turn, requires more formal governance mechanisms.

Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001 (hereafter SLDB) argue that private owners’
preferences are expressed in economic as well as non-economic terms. According to SLDB, a
major source of the non-economically motivated behavior is altruism which “allows the
individual to simultaneously satisfy both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic
(self-regarding) preferences” (p. 102). They empirically test this proposition through a sample of
family firms. SLDB (2001) suggest that a good corporate governance system is needed for private
firms as well to reign in the non-economic preferences that are likely to negatively affect a firm’s
performance.

In conclusion, the two theories offer opposite implications regarding the role of
governance for private firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that a governance system is
not only unnecessary but may lead to reduction in the firm’s value, while SLDB (2001) suggest
that a governance system is not only necessary but augments a private firm’s value. We contribute
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to this debate by examining the effect of the governance system on the survivability and
performance of US start-up firms.

Despite the presence of a wide range of governance studies and its impact on larger firms'
performance, the governance patterns of newly created firms remain relatively unexplored. A
principal reason for the paucity of research has been the unavailability of reliable data. These
firms are not required to disclose financial information since they do not offer debt or equity to
the public. In addition, since a startup firm is not subject to SEC regulations, it is not required to
maintain any specific governance structure (for example, the presence of a Board of Directors
overseeing firm management). Opportunely, a recent and unique data set, the Kauffman Firm
Survey (KFS) provides data, among other items, on ownership structure, board structure, and the
ways start-ups meet their financing needs. The KFS dataset is the largest longitudinal study
conducted on new businesses1. The KFS is a panel dataset that spans eight years and allows us
to study the governance behavior of newly created firms by examining the control choices that
small firms make when they launch and ask whether any patterns of governance emerge from
the data that may impact such firms' survival. The primary issue that we address in this paper is
the impact, if any, of the governance system on a start-up firm's performance and survivability.

Our study builds upon the analysis conducted in Lowrey (2009), which examined the
dynamics and characteristics of startup firms from the Kauffman Firm Survey from 2004 until
2006. Our study provides an extension to Lowrey (2009) by using start-up firm data over a longer
period of time as well as focusing on the governance factors that affect a firms’ survival through
a series of logit regressions. Our results indicate that the presence of one or more independent
board member(s), the separation between CEO and board chair, and external funding are
effective factors that promote a start-up's longevity. We find that cross-sectional variations in the
ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. We do find that firm
governance structure impacts firm performance, and this holds with our robustness checks that

1

About the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). (n.d.). Retrieved March 05, 2018, from
https://www.kauffman.org/microsites/kfs/about-the-kfs
2

measure firm performance through Return on Assets (ROA), sales growth, and employment
growth. Our results contribute to the understanding of what types of firm governance systems
effect firm performance and survival. These findings are beneficial to start-up managers,
investors, and organizations that foster entrepreneurship, such as business incubators and
accelerators.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. First, it reviews the relevant literature
for governance in startup firms before developing hypotheses on how the different governance
patterns impact the startup survival and performance. Next, it describes the research design of
the empirical study. Thereafter, we present and explain the results. Finally, we summarize and
conclude.

2. Governance of Start-up Firms
2.1. Governance and Firms Survival

The literature on organization demographics highlights that newer and smaller firms are
less likely to survive (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). While start-up firms cannot do much in terms
of their age, but they can avoid the liability of smallness through rapid growth. Past growth
provides a firm to increase the likelihood of future survival. Thus, firms benefit from a sustained
growth pattern. Growth and survival analyses have been relatively well covered in the literature
on firm dynamics. Both areas share common variables such as size, experience, and owners'
characteristics just to cite a few. Gibrat's Law states that a firm's growth rate is independent of its
size. Previous studies provide empirical evidence that suggests that Gibrat's Law may be wrong
or at least wrong to a certain extent (Kumar 1985, Evans 1987, Hall 1987).
A limited number of models have been developed to explain these age effects. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) adds a theoretical model of size (equity) and age effects on firm's dynamics and
provides a significant contribution to the literature on firm dynamics. They contribute to the
literature by simultaneously taking both firm size and age dependency into consideration, after
they introduce financial frictions into the model. Cooley and Quadrini state that debt matters and
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causes of firm failure. The model depicted by Cooley and Quadrini predicts that newer firms tend
to take on more debt which increases the profit volatility, thus increasing firm failure.
The age hypothesis cannot be tested directly using the KFS since all firms are part of the
same cohort together with the KFS being a relatively new dataset. Instead, it is tested for indirectly
through the debt hypothesis. Financial conditions, which include debt, equity, and leverage have
also been a vital part of a firms' dynamics in the literature. KFS offers a full range of data for every
life stage of the financial health of the company. Also, Cooley and Quadrini find that leverage
that is described as debt over equity decreases with the firm's size since smaller firms take on
more debt. When relating these findings to firm size and survival literature (probability of exit
decreases with size), we can assume that the probability of a firm exit should decrease with
additional leverage. Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) study the initial financing conditions of the
firm effects on survival. They argue that probability of survival is increasing with initial external
debt, although a negative correlation exists between initial bank loans and survival. On the other
hand, Huynh et al. (2008) suggest that a firm's exit probability is increasing with leverage.
Thompson (2005) examines how selection bias can occur when assessing firm quality, and
provided a framework for tackling this issue. Because of this, I test for the effects of quality using
years of experience in the industry, as suggested by Thompson (2005).

2.2. Board of Directors
Board composition is determined using Weisbach’s (1988) trichotomous classification
scheme. A director who is a full-time employee of the company is classified as an inside director.
A director who is neither an employee nor has extensive dealings with the company is referred
to as an outside director. All other directors, who are not full-time employees but have
relationships with the company (for example, family relationships, consultants) are designated
as “gray” directors or “affiliates.” Director classification is determined by reading biographies in
annual reports, analyzing related party transactions, and by inference from the definition of
family firm.
The agency theory and resource dependency theory provide fundamental support for an
appropriate BOD to control agency cost and provide valuable resources to the firm in the form of
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finance and capital, links to key suppliers, customers, and significant stakeholders (see Jackling
& Johl, 2009). Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that a larger board has advantages such as
sharing of management and expertise and the capacity to oppose any illogical decisions made by
the CEO while Jensen (1993) argues that a larger board creates agency costs, gives rise to free
rider problems, delays in making good decisions and in actively supervising the firm (see also
Goodstein, Gautam &Boeker, 1994; Shaw, 1976).
Daily and Dalton (1992) find that founders or entrepreneurial firms may use outside
directors to obtain desired firm growth. Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, and Dennis (2000) find that
small private firms adopt outside directors primarily to appease external owners and utilize the
services and resource benefits offered by outside directors. Dutia (2014) supports startups to
establish boards into their governance structure, because "A well-functioning board's activities
can result in a well-timed exit strategy that creates an opportunity to sell the company, make an
Initial Public Offering (IPO), or further scale and grow the business. Gabrielsson (2003) contends
that the benefits of SMEs establishing a board of directors and further research is needed to
provide a deeper understanding of how a board of directors can contribute to the SME
performance. The involvement and formal structure of the board is vital for the board's ability to
perform effectively Gabrielsson and Winlund (2000).
Fried, Bruton, and Hisrich (1998) provide evidence supporting a relationship between
board involvement and performance. Johannisson and Huse (2000) state that the
"professionalization" of the board enforces managerialism. Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003)
propose a theory that, "board composition and, consequently, firm performance are a reflection
of both the firm's life cycle stage and the relative power of the CEO and external financiers at the
time of founding." Politis and Landström (2002) discuss how firms must balance corporate
governance with the ability to access required resources and maintain control to be able to make
fast strategic decisions.

2.3. Ownership
Brunninge, Nordqvist, and Wiklund (2007) find that governance variables relate to
ownership, the board of directors, and management have an impact on strategic change and
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emphasizes the importance of analyzing the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms.
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2002) examine private firm's agency problems, which may stem
from the firm's ownership structure. Uhlaner, Floren, and Geerlings (2007) focus on the
governance structure of privately-held firms and finds that owner commitment has an impact on
firm performance, which supports stewardship theory and organizational social capital theory.
Owners have more of a personal stake in the success of a firm, while a professional manager
incentive is limited to what is stated in the employment contract (Alcorn, 1982). Nordqvist (2005)
proposes that three processes shape ownership in family firms are, "channeling ownership
through formal intentions and vision, channeling ownership through informal interaction, and
channeling ownership through symbolic embodiment in the strategic work. Daily and Dollinger
(1992) survey a sample of private firms that are professionally-managed or family firms and find
that family firms tend to be smaller and younger than professionally-managed firms.
The decision of what business entity a start-up will become provides a framework for
ownership as well as the liabilities the business owners will be liable for. Malch, Robinson, and
Radcliffe (2006) explore the different types of legal issues that the various business types are
subject to and find that certain issues are relevant to all new business ventures, certain issues are
relevant to specific types of ventures, and specific business categories. The business entity
decision may be influenced by the entrepreneur’s attorney or accountant. Blair and Marcum
(2015) discuss both the advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the main business
entities that start-ups become and provide partial evidence that supports that attorneys and
accountants advise entrepreneurs to select their business entity based on liability yet also provide
evidence that accountants focus on advising entrepreneurs more on the basis of firm taxation. We
examine what types of business entities survive by examining Sole Proprietorships, Limited
Liability Corporations (LLCs), S Corporations, C Corporations, and Partnerships.

2.4. Debt Financing sources
Research argues that personal guarantees and personal collateral must often be posted to
secure financing for startups (Moon, 2009; Avery, Bostic and Samalyk, 1998; Mann, 1998). Robb
and Robinson (2010) show that the heavy reliance of new firms on external debt especially bank
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loans underscores the importance of well-functioning credit markets for the success of nascent
business activity as the financing agreements of bank loans Promote higher quality firm
performance and more sustainable growth. Because startups rely so extensively on the outside
debt as a source of their capital, they are especially more sensitive to changes in the bank lending
conditions, perhaps more than suggested based on accounts of entrepreneurial finance that focus
on the importance of informal capital.

3.

The Relation between Governance and Performance

Some governance features may be motivated by incentive-based economic models of
managerial behavior. Broadly speaking, these models fall into two categories. In agency models,
a divergence in the interests of managers and shareholders causes managers to take actions that
are costly to shareholders. Contracts cannot preclude this activity if shareholders are unable to
observe managerial behavior directly, but ownership by the manager may be used to induce
managers to act in a manner that is consistent with the interest of shareholders. Grossman and
Hart (1983) describe this problem. Adverse selection models are motivated by the hypothesis of
differential ability that cannot be observed by shareholders. In this setting, ownership may be
used to induce revelation of the manager's private information about cash flow or her ability to
generate cash flow, which cannot be observed directly by shareholders. A general treatment is
provided by Myerson (1987). In the above scenarios, some features of corporate governance may
be interpreted as a characteristic of the contract that governs relations between shareholders and
managers. Governance is affected by the same unobservable features of managerial behavior or
ability that are linked to ownership and performance.

The board processes have a substantive impact on firm performance, and meetings are
necessary to execute board task effectiveness (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). When the board of
directors meets frequently, they are more likely to discuss the concerned issues and monitor the
management more effectively, thereby performing their duties with better coordination and in
harmony with shareholders' interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Consistent with this notion,
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Conger et al. (1998) suggested that board meeting time is an important resource for improving
the board effectiveness and, thus, better decision-making. But, there are also costs attached to
board meetings, which include expenses such as managerial time, travel expense, directors' fees
and other resources (Vafeas, 1999). Both Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) discuss the
limited time available for meetings may not be sufficient for enough dialogue among directors.
Notably, Jensen (1993) argues that boards should be relatively inactive and are required to
become active only in the times of crisis.

There is also an ongoing debate on CEO duality and firm performance, but the results
from the empirical studies are conflicting (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Balinga et al.,
1996; Coles and Hesterly, 2000; Elsayed, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2002). Bhagat and Bolton (2002)
have found the CEO–Chair separation to be significantly positively correlated with firm's
operating performance. Boyd (1995) also indicated that CEO duality actually improves firm
performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) also supported separation of CEO and chair positions,
as the firms opting for independent leadership outperformed the firms relying on CEO duality.
Some authors found no significant difference between the firms with CEO duality and those
without it (Daily and Dalton, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998). In fact, Daily and Dalton (1997) suggested
that separation of CEO and board chair positions results in a misdirected effort.

In addition, ownership control and institutional ownership are also important
determinants of firm performance. An example is Agyemang and Castellini (2015), which focuses
on how ownership control and board control systems operate in corporate firms in emerging
economies, such Ghana, and assume that these systems are an integral part for enhancing good
corporate governance practices in emerging countries. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) find that
institutional shareholding enhances market valuation. In contrast, Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008)
investigate the role of corporate governance indices on firm performance (earnings per share,
return on assets [ROA], return on equity [ROE]) and find that the there is no positive association
with the presence of institutional investors and firm performance. Overall, the empirical findings
on corporate governance and firm performance have been very mixed. On the one hand, several
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studies estimated that better corporate governance significantly enhances firm performance
(Brickley and James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992;
Lee et al., 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 2000; Chung et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2003;
Beiner et al., 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Black et al., 2006). On the other hand, some others
(Bathala and Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002; Bauer et al., 2004) reported an inverse relationship
between corporate governance and firm performance. There are also studies which reported no
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1991; Park and Shin, 2003; Prevost et al., 2002; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003).

4.

Survival vs. Performance

The growth and profitability path of firms of new firms (startups) is vital for management
theory (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). Since in Penrose (1959), who develop the original
"theory of the growth of the firm" which states that the managerial resources play a pivotal role,
where several factors affect growth. Certain factors, such as population density or market forces,
are considered to be external to the organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Porter, 1980), while
others factors are internal, such as capabilities, culture, or strategy (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;
Boeker, 1997; Garnsey, 1998; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; Canals, 2000, chapter 3). In research on
entrepreneurship, previous studies examine the characteristics that are specific to entrepreneurial
firms (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).

Both the organizations and economics literature offer rationales for previous growth
having the ability to increase the probability of future growth. This forms the growth momentum
hypothesis. The literature on organization demographics highlights that firms which are newer
and smaller in size are less likely to survive (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Industry statistics from
Dun & Bradstreet (1998) also support the liabilities of newness and smallness. While startups
cannot do anything about their age, they can avoid this liability of small size by rapid growth.
Past growth will enable a firm to increase the likelihood of their future survival. Therefore, firms
will benefit from a sustained growth pattern. The momentum that is implicit in this continuous
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growth pattern can be based on different sources of advantage. Some of these advantages are
external to the organization and related to both the density and institutional characteristics of the
market niche that the firm is competing in (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). New firm growth may
be based on the choice of the right niche where it can be successful. The organizational literature
also indicates that forces internal to the organization may drive sustained growth. Internal
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) can provide new firms with the conditions needed to
grow and succeed.
A strand of literature promoting experience as an important contributor to survival has
been developed. Research has tackled two main areas pertaining to firms' experience. First, past
studies find the effects on owners' pre-entry experience to be a persistent determinant of
performance in the years following entry. Second, the more related the experience is to the
industry in which the firm operates the more valuable it is. Thompson studies both effects in the
shipbuilding industry, and his findings reinforce Klepper and Simons' (2000) suggestion that
firms with more experience in related fields of the industry perform better than de novo entrants
with less experience.

5.

Methodology
5.1. Hypothesis
Based on the previous study review, we test the following two hypotheses:
H1: Controlling for the firm's size and industry affiliation, the better the governance, the better a
firm's performance.
We test the impact of these governance variables on startup performance measured by its return
on equity (ROE) as;
The governance factors included in this paper are:
•

Independent Director on the Board: The dummy takes on a value of 1 if the firm's board has
an independent member, it is 0 otherwise. According to Daily and Dalton (1992), founders
of entrepreneurial firms should use outside directors to obtain desired firm growth and
increase their survivability chances
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•

Duality - Separation between CEO and Board Chair: The dummy takes on a value of 1, if the
two positions are held by two different persons, it takes on a value of 0 otherwise.

•

Robb and Robinson (2010) show that the heavy reliance of new firms on external debt
especially bank loans promote higher quality firm performance and more sustainable
growth.
o

Bank Business Loan or Line of Credit as % of Total Debt

o

Government Loans as a % of Total Equity

o

Bank Loan + Line of Credit % of Total Loan

o

Owner +Insider Loan % of Total Loan

On the second hypothesis, we test the impact of these governance variables on startup
performance measured by its survival as follow:

H2: Survived startups adopt more efficient governance patterns than non-survived startups.
Using the governance variables mentioned below and the startup survival as a binary variable
of 1 or 0. The second hypothesis tests the impact of the governance structure on the startup
survival.
We use the same governance variables mentioned above and survival as the dependent variable.

5.2. Variables
Governance variables: The following variables are the main ones used to measure
governance in the startup firms: ownership structure, board structure, and financing sources.
•

Ownership structure is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is
owned by a single owner (i.e., proprietor) and zero if the firm is owned by multiple
owners;

•

Board structure is proxied by the presence of one or more independent directors
on the board. Outsiders on the board of directors is any director who is unrelated
to the family. We use a dummy variable to capture the essence of this variable: it
takes a value of 1 if the board has an independent director, zero otherwise.
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•

For sources of financing, we employ several proxies:
o

Ratio of debt to equity= Measured using the median leverage of all firms and
ranking firms as above and below the median.

•

o

Financing via owners

o

Financing via bank loan

o

Financing via government finance; and

o

Financing via venture capital

Firm Size: The impact of the firm's size on the performance and survival has been
significantly proven in many studies. As the greater size give the firm greater
opportunity for economies of scale which in turn lowers the cost of capital and
improve the performance. The firm size may also have a negative impact on the
performance, because the bigger the size; the greater is the information asymmetry
which leads to more agency costs and less performance efficiency. The effect of
the firm size on the performance can either be positive or negative. Based on
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) who added a theoretical model of size (equity) and
age effects on firm's dynamics, firm size and age provide a significant impact on
its performance and survival. We measure asset size by the logarithm of total
assets of the firm, and the number of full-time employees for robustness.

•

Industry dummy: As the Kaufmann survey is more focused on the tech industry,
and as the firm performance depends on the nature of its activity. The dummy
variable takes a value of one if a firm operates in the technology sector, and zero
otherwise.

5.3. The Model
The first hypothesis H1 is tested into two ways; the first is using the direct regression of
performance on the other variables,

ROEij = b0j + b1j OWNi + b2j DUALi + b3j BOARDi + b4j OWNEQi + b45 GOVEQi + b6j VENi
+ b7j BANKi + b8j LOG(Size)i + b9j Industryi + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗
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The second approach used to test the second hypothesis is the 2sls regression based on ROE is
adopted as a measure of performance. However, extant literature highlights potential
endogeneity problems surrounding regression analyses of corporate governance mechanisms
and performance. Thus, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) propose the use of 2SLS regressions in the
context of endogenously determined corporate governance mechanisms. The method involves,
first, estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) predictions for each endogenous regressor. Second,
each of the predictions is regressed on ROE together to determine consistent estimates for each
endogenous regressor. This method allows for the interdependence and alternative use of all of
the governance mechanisms.
To test H2, an analogous method to that of Agrawal and Knoeber is applied to a restricted
subsample that includes only the survived firms. A 2SLS regression is estimated by regressing
five endogenous corporate governance variables on ROE. Predictions for each of the endogenous
independent variables is estimated from the following equations:

First stage regression:
OWNi0∑1𝑗≠𝑂𝑊𝑁 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij
DEBTi0∑1𝑗≠𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij
BODi0∑1𝑗≠𝐵𝑂𝐷 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij
DUALi0∑1𝑗≠𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij
LEVi0∑1𝑗≠𝐿𝐸𝑉 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij

Second stage regression:

ROEi 0 1 OWNi 2 DEBTi 3 BODi 4LEVi5 DUALi6 SIZEi6 INDi ij

where the first five independent variables (excluding the constant term) are the predicted values
from regressions 1 through 5. If the coefficients in the equation of second stage regression are
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significant, the null in H2 will be rejected: there is evidence to suggest that survived firms adopt
suboptimal corporate governance structures. In other words, any significance in the model's
independent variables that persists into the second stage is inconsistent with wealth
maximization. That is, significant positive coefficients suggest that increasing the use of the
governance mechanism would improve performance, whereas negative coefficients suggest that
reducing the use of the governance mechanism would lead to performance improvements. If the
mechanism is used optimally, it should not be significantly related to performance in the second
stage (its coefficient should not be significantly different from zero).

To test the second hypothesis of governance variables effect on survival, we use model that is
similar to the one used in Anderson et al. (1998) in the context of diversification and corporate
governance. The first set of regressions is as follows:

SURVIVALij = b0j + b1j OWNi + b2j DUALi + b3j BOARDi + b4j OWNEQi + b45 GOVEQi
+ b6j VENi + b7j BANKi + b8j LOG(Size)i + b9j Industryi + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗

where the subscript i denotes the firm- level observation for each variable in 2004 to 2011 and
Governance represents each of the possible corporate governance variables that may be used as
dependent variables (ownership, board composition, Leverage and debt financing source).

6.

Data

We utilize Kauffman Survey Data which tracks a sample of firms from their inceptions
through their first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from 2004 until
2013. The data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy, innovation,
organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owner-operators are
defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the day-to-day
operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating assistance"
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(Farhat and Robb, 2014). Several studies have used KFS data to further understand new firm
characteristics, such as analyzing the financing of new firms (Coleman and Robb, 2009; 2011; Cole
and Sokolyk, 2013), comparisons of different types of new firms (Welsh, Desplaces, and Davis,
2011), and firm survival (Robb and Reynolds, 2009).

Robb et al. (2009) and Ballou et al. (2007) provide thorough descriptions of the sampling
process used to construct the initial sample. They report that the target population for the survey
was all new businesses that were started in the 2004 calendar year in the United States
(representing activity in each of the ﬁfty states plus the District of Columbia). The objective of the
KFS dataset is to track the progress of their sample from the target population, with the specified
target population being new firms. A business started in 2004 is deﬁned as a "new, independent
business that was created by a single person or a team of people, the purchase of an existing
business, or the purchase of a franchise." Businesses are excluded if they had an EIN, Schedule C
income, or had paid state unemployment insurance or federal Social Security taxes before or after
2004. One challenge with developing a sample of startups in the United States is that there is no
national registry of startups.

The sampling frame for the KFS is based on the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database and
restricted to businesses (or enterprises) that are reported by D&B as starting in 2004. This database
is a compilation of data from various sources, including credit bureaus, state oﬃces that register
some new businesses, and companies (e.g., credit card and shipping companies) that are likely to
be used by all businesses. Importantly, this is not the same database as the D&B business registry
available on the Internet; the sample from which our data are drawn contains vastly greater
coverage of ﬁrms in the United States.

The KFS data includes an oversample of high-tech ﬁrms; thus, all of our analyses use
sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the frame from which the sample
was drawn. The practice of oversampling the main subgroup of a population in survey data in
reaction to a more limited size of a subgroup for a focused interest on a specific subgroup is
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commonly used in surveys that focus on policy-making. The reason why the Kauffman Survey
has oversampled high-technology and medium-technology businesses is for improving standalone analysis and comparative analysis precision as well as subgroup cross-sectional and
longitudinal analysis precision (Farhat and Robb, 2014). The objective of creating the sample of
the KFS was to interview 5000 firms that were created in 2004. From the 251,282 businesses in the
Dunn and Bradstreet database, KFS chose a stratified sample of 32,469 firms. Subsequently, MPR
was capable of finding the location of 29,526 firms from the sample of 32,469 and 16,156 of these
firms finished the baseline survey. Of these, 11,228 firms were illegible, which left 4,928 firms in
the final sample.

7.

Results
7.1. Descriptive Statistics
We report in Table 1 the summary statistics for the KFS firms through the sample survey
from 2004 till 2011 showing the summary for business characteristics and governance variables.
Panel A reports the business characteristics. Panel A shows the business characteristics results
show that the average size of the firms in the sample is $8062 while the maximum is $113,220, In
addition, the average ROA ratio in the sample is 5% with a maximum of 21%. While the highest
ROE is 5% with a maximum of 23%.
On panel B we report the descriptive statistics of governance variables. The average
percentage of Government Loans is 46% while bank loan averages at 39%.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the study variables; business characteristics and governance
variables, through the sample survey from 2004 until 2011 showing the mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum.
Startup Firms
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Panel A: Business Characteristics
Employment Growth %
Sales Growth%
Size in $
ROE%
ROA%

37
34
8,062
4.0
5.0

12
19
11,887
6.8
8.3
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3
-21
3190
-8.2
-7.3

91
82
113,220
21
23

Panel B: Governance Variables
Government Loans %
Bank loan %
credit Line %
Owner + insider loan %

26
49
44
84

31
50
30
56

11
6
7
34

55
67
78
98

In Table 2, we report the descriptive statistics for the firms survived through the sample
survey from 2004 till 2011 showing the firms that survived, exit and or sold every year. Failed
firms are the ones going into financial distress by the end of the year. From the total of 4928 firms
starting in 2004, 5.2% of them exited the market in their first year, 5% the following year, 3.8% in
2007, 4.3% in 2008. We can conclude that more than 18% of the firms exited the market in their
first four years of their life, and more than 7% of them were sold or merged in the same period.
The balance of the start-ups failed.
Table 2: Startup survival by Year from 2004 till 2011

Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the firms survived through the sample survey from 2004 until
2011 showing the firms that survived, exit and or sold every year. We consider a firm as a ‘failed firm’ if
the firms go into financial distress by the end of the year.

2004
2005
2006

Survived
4928
3998
3390

Exit
0
260
247

Sold or merged
0
43
36

Failed
0
627
325

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2915
2606
2408
2126
2007

188
213
141
133
109

36
25
23
20
11

251
71
34
129
0

Figure 1 shows the sample distribution of the start-up firms based on the ownership
structures. As shown in Figure 1, partnership structure has the highest number of firms with of
independent directors on its board, as well as owners' finance, bank loans, and venture capital
finance. While the single owner firms appear to be the highest in terms of government finance.
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Figure 1: governance variables based on ownership structures

Table 3 provides the survival rate of start-ups based on the legal form of a firm's
organization. Both in terms of five years survival and seven years of survival, a partnership
organization survives the most, followed by proprietorships. LLCs are the least survived. The
survival rate is the highest for the partnership at 86.89 and 73.78 for five and seven years
respectively. While it is the lowest for the limited liability corporations for 37.98 and 24.42 for five
and seven years respectively.
Table 3: Survival rate by the form of organization

Table 3 reflects the survival rate of start-ups based on the legal form of a firm’s organization, which are
Sole Proprietorships (Sole Prop), Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs), C Corporations (C Corp), S
Corporations (S Corp), and Partnerships (which include). The survival variables are the number of firms
that have survived for five years (#Survived (5 years)), the percentage of firms that have survived for
five years (%Survived (5 years)), the number of firms that have survived for seven years (#Survived (7
years)), and the percentage of firms that have survived for seven years (%Survived (7 years)).
Sole
LLC
C Corp
S Corp
Partnership
Prop
(Gen Part +LTD part)
#Start-ups1635
1556
440
1039
206
#Survived (5 years)
982
591
225
531
179
%Survived (5 years)
60.06
37.98
51.36
51.1
86.89
# Survived (7 years)
%Survived (7 years)

922
56.39

380
24.42

131
29.77
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422
40.61

152
73.78

7.2. Sources of Financing by Organizational Form

Table 4 shows how different types of start-up organizations fund their investments. As
expected, the principal source of financing of the start-ups is equity provides by the owners or their
immediate family. Equity funding is used by 88% of partnerships compared to 78% of C
corporations. The second most important source is the debt provided by owners and family
members of the owners. This type of funding is most popular with the proprietorship type
organization: about 56% of this category rely on internal debt. The equity provided by the equity
seems to be the third most popular funding method.

Table 4: Sources of Financing by Organizations of Start-ups

Table 4 shows how different types of start-up organizations fund their investments. The legal form of a firm’s
organization, which are Sole Proprietorships (Sole Prop), Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs), C
Corporations (C Corp), S Corporations (S Corp), and Partnerships (including general partnership and limited
partnership). The variables for financing sourcing are Owner Equity (Owner EQ), Insider Equity (Insider EQ),
Owner Debt, Insider Debt, Business Bank Loan, Personal Bank Loan by Owners, Government Business Loan
(Gov Business loan), Government Loans (Gov Loans), Venture Capital, and Business Equity (Business Eq).
Sole
Prop
(%)

LLC
(%)

C
Corp
(%)

S
Corp
(%)

Partnership
(Gen Part + LTD part)
(%)

Total

Firms

1635

1556

440

1039

206

4917

Owner EQ

1308
(.80)

1211
(.78)

331
(.75)

851
(.82)

181
(.88)

3,733

Insider EQ

40
(.024)

30
(.019)

15
(.034)

24
(.023)

13
(.063)

122

Owner Debt

614
(.376)

379
(.244)

40
(.091)

209
(.201)

23
(.112)

1,256

Insider Debt

291
(.178)

456
(.293)

112
(.255)

203
(.195)

22
(.107)

1084

Business
Bank Loan

107
(.065)

231
(.148)

31
(.070)

69
(.066)

9
(.043)

447

Personal Bank Loan by
owners

93
(.057)

91
(.058)

28
(.064)

87
(.084)

15
(.073)

314

Gov Business loan

51
(.032)

48
(.031)

5
(.011)

26
(.025)

14
(.068)

144

Gov Loans

229
(.14)

140
(.089)

72
(.164)

97
(.094)

28
(.136)

566

Venture capital

41
(.025)

37
(.024)

25
(.057)

34
(.033)

6
(.029)

143

19

Business Eq

2
(.001)

19
(.012)

9
(.02)

15
(.014)

5
(.024)

50

Table 5 shows the correlation between the study variables as well as the means and
standard deviation. The correlation is positive between all the variables except for the correlation
between chair/CEO separation and ownership loan as a percentage of the total loan.
Table 5: Pairwise correlations

Table 5 shows the pairwise correlation between the study variables including; Sole Proprietorship, board
independence, chair/CEO separation, Venture capital percentage of total equity, bank loan and line of credit,
owner insider loan, ROE, ROA, employment growth, sales growth, and industry.
Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

PROPREITORSHIP
BOARD INDEPENDENCE

0.30**

CHAIR/CEO SEPARATION

0.16**

0.24**

0.19**

0.15** 0.28**

VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL EQ
GOV LOANS % OF TOTAL EQ

0.14** 0.22** 0.17** 0.12**
BANK LOAN+LINE OR CREDIT % OF
TOTAL LOAN

0.25**

0.18**

OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF TOTAL
LOAN

0.22**

0.15***

ROE

0.31**

0.13**

ROA
Sales Growth
Employment Growth
Industry

0.09** 0.16** 0.15**
-0.13** 0.19**

0.02** 0.23**

0.07** 0.18***

0.32** 0.03** 0.14**

0.19**

0.16**

0.06** 0.11** 0.12** 0.10**

0.07*** 0.13** 0.25**

0.05**

0.20**

0.08*** 0.11**

0.09***

0.13** 0.11**

0.09** 0.05**

0.12** 0.14** 0.22**
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0.04**

0.10** 0.9***
0.18** 0.07** 0.12**

7.3. Governance system and ROE

Table 6 shows how the governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured
by ROE. The governance measures are as reported above. Specification 3 of the regressions is of
primary relevance to our study. It shows that controlling for the firm size and the industry, crosssectional variations in the ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables
presence of one or more independent board member on the board, separation between the person
holding the CEO position and the person holding the board chair position, greater presence of
venture capital, and greater use of bank loans. The presence of government loans, however, does
not affect a start-up’s ROE, perhaps because of poor monitoring activities provided by the
government.

Table 6: Governance system and Startup performance (ROE)
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Table 6 shows how the governance system affects a start-up's performance as measured by ROE. The
governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of
Total Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or
Credit Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification
3 of the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations
in the ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.
SPEC 1

SPEC 2

SPEC 3

PROP=1
OTHER ORG=0
SIZE (LOG OF ASSET)

.032
(0.403)
.097
(0.140)

.099
(.112)
.223***
(.009)

.093
(.156)

INDUSTRY*

.077*
(0.093)

.043***
(.002)

.073*
(.099)

BOARD
INDEPENDENCE

.072**
(.010)

.076***
(.001)

CHAIR/CEO
SEPARATION
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL
EQUITY
GOV LOANS %
TOTAL EQUITY

.742***
(0.001)
.072***
(.001)
.542
(0.193)

.744***
(.001)
.70**
(.021)
.556
(.203)

BANK LOAN + LINE
OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN

.069***
(.002)

.066**
(.019)

OWNER + INSIDER LOAN % OF
TOTAL LOAN

.009***

.088***

CONSTANT

(.001)
-.302

(.001)
-.218

YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

(0.182)
YES

YES

(.102)
YES

R2

.896

.293

.667

7.4. Governance system and Survival
Table 7 presence in 4 specifications the factors that affect the survival length of start-ups.
Once again, Specification 3 is the most relevant to this study: it shows that controlling for the size
and industry, the presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between
CEO and board chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up's
longevity.
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The results show that governance variables significantly explain startup survival. Board
independency, CEO/chair separation positively significantly impact survival, while the form of
organization (Sole proprietorship) does not affect survival. In addition, Government Loans turns
to have no significant effect on survival, where all other finance sources explain survival
significantly. The R square is the highest for the fourth specification explaining 86% of the startup
survival.

Table 7: Governance System and Survival of Start-ups

Table 6 presents in 4 specifications the factors that affect the survival length of start-ups. This table presents
LOGIT results, where a surviving firm takes on a value of 1, the firm that failed takes on a value of 0.
Specification 3 shows that controlling for the size and industry, the presence of one or more independent
board member(s), the separation between CEO and board chair, and external funding are effective factors that
promote a start-up's longevity.
SPEC 1
.821**
(.039)
.799***
(.008)

BOARD INDEP

.822**
(.051)

SPEC 4
1.012
(.169)
.882***
(.000)
.620
(.219)
.810
(.201)

CEO/CHAIR SEPA

.989***
(.000)
.993***
(.001)
- .972***
(.004)
.819*
(.094)

.980***
(.000)
.971***
(.000)
- .917***
(.001)
.872
(.134)
.730***
(.009)
.891
(.182)
YES
.856

SIZE
INDUSTRY
PROP=1 / OTHER ORG=0

SPEC 2
.899*
(.082)
.891***
(.001)
.611
(.124)

BANK FIN+LINE OF CREDIT AS % OF TOTAL DEBT
OWNER+INSIDER DEBT AS A % TOTAL DEBT
GOVT EQ AS A % TOTAL EQUITY
VENTURE CAP AS A % OF TOTAL EQUITY

SPEC 3
.982*
(.089)
.782*
(.088)

Year Fixed Effects

.891**
(.013)
YES

.988**
(.009)
YES

.773**
(.017)
.812
(.132)
YES

R2

.301

.320

.599

Constant
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7.5. Robustness Check

To conduct our robustness checks, we first run a logistic regression with three
specifications that examine how a firm's governance system affects a start-up firm's performance.
We measure firm performance through Return on Assets. Our governance measures include
Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total Equity,
Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit
Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification
3 of the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional
variations in the ROA of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. These
results are reflect in Table 8.

We then examine the effect of a firm’s governance system on its performance through
sales growth. We use the same governance measures as in Table 8. We find that Specification 3 of
the regressions shows that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations
in the Sales growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. These results
are reflected in Table 9. Similarly, we examine the effect of a firm’s governance system on
performance through employment growth., incorporating the same governance measures as in
the models used in Table 8 and 9. We find that Specification 3 of the regressions shows that
controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the Employment
Growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.
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Table 8: Governance system and ROA

Table 8 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by ROA. The governance
measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total Equity,
Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit Percentage
of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of the regressions show
that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the ROA of the start-up firms
can be explained by governance variables.
SPEC 1

SPEC 2

PROP=1

.039

.099

OTHER ORG=0

(0.554)

(.112)

SIZE (LOG OF ASET)

.021*

.034***

.084**

(0.073)

(.001)

(.016)

.124*

.056***

.082*

(0.081)

(.003)

(.083)

INDUSTRY*

SPEC 3

BOARD

.044**

.033**

INDEPENDENCE

(.023)

(.011)

CHAIR/CEO

.922***

.821***

SEPARATION

(0.003)

(.002)

VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL

.055***

.922**

EQ

(.002)

(.031)

GOV LOANS %

.669

.734

TOTAL EQ

(0.211)

(.982)

BANK LOAN+LINE

.043***

.034**

OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN

(.001)

(.023)

OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF
TOTAL LOAN

.010***

.064***

(.001)

(.001)

Constant

-.244

-.332

(.208)

(.434)

Year Fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

R2

.772

.332

.506

25

Table 9: Governance system and Sales growth

Table 9 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by Sales Growth. The
governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total
Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit
Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of the
regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the Sales
growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.
SPEC 1

SPEC 2

PROP=1

.043

.099

OTHER ORG=0

(0.778)

(.882)

SIZE (LOG OF ASET)

.189*

.023***

.022

(0.092)

(.001)

(.211)

.065

.721*

.372*

(0.198)

(.224)

(.019)

INDUSTRY*

SPEC 3

BOARD

.022**

.009***

INDEPENDENCE

(.008)

(.000)

CHAIR/CEO

.032**

.033***

SEPARATION

(0.019)

(.001)

VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL

.065***

.922**

EQ

(.003)

(.122)

GOV LOANS %

.597

.342

TOTAL EQ

(0.227)

(.129)

BANK LOAN+LINE

.032***

.021**

OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN

(.004)

(.009)

OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF
TOTAL LOAN

.001***

.043***

(.000)

(.001)

Constant

-.665

-.697

(0.360)

(.301)

Year Fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

R2

.667

.109

.439
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Table 10: Governance system and Employment Growth

Table 10 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by Employment
Growth. The governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage
of Total Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or
Credit Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of
the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the
Employment Growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.
SPEC 1

SPEC 2

PROP=1

.192

.099

OTHER ORG=0

(0.451)

(.112)

SIZE (LOG OF ASET)

.102*

.035***

.228

(0.102)

(.003)

(.430)

.093

.029***

.092*

(0.012)

(.002)

(.089)

INDUSTRY*

SPEC 3

BOARD

.072**

.055***

INDEPENDENCE

(.010)

(.003)

CHAIR/CEO

.912***

.810***

SEPARATION

(0.001)

(.001)

VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL

.105**

.921**

EQ

(.011)

(.012)

GOV LOANS %

.744

.754

TOTAL EQ

(0.231)

(.423)

BANK LOAN+LINE

.009***

.043***

OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN

(.000)

(.009)

OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF
TOTAL LOAN

.291

.088***

(.599)

(.001)

Constant

-.104

-.145

(0.223)

(.334)

Year Fixed effects

YES

YES

YES

R2

.791

.330

.439

27

8. Discussion
The goal of this paper was to investigate the influence of governance mechanisms on
entrepreneurial firm performance when such firms face different financial uncertainty and
instability. To achieve this, we used a longitudinal collected data for nearly 5000 firm during their
first 8 years of existence starting from 2004. Our research shows that the type of ownership (sole
Properietorship, partnership, etc.) is not significantly related to the firm performance, while
independent board and duality did show a significant positive effect on start-up performance.
On the other side, different sources of finance (Venture capital, bank loan, owner loan) did show
a direct positive significant relationship with start-up performance. This result support the
reasoning that venture capitalists would bring a unique set of resources to the firm, which in turn
impact its performance positively (Bruton, Fried & Hisrich, 1997).
Surprisingly, our results show insignificant effect for government loans (SBA) on the firm
performance. An explanation of our results can be found as a small portion of the firms in our
sample use SBA loans. Firms in the sample are also are primarily in high-tech industries and in
turn may look to venture capital and other forms of financing that support high-growth firms. In
addition, lending institutions may not be able to properly assess the risk of loans for start-ups,
which creates issues with information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This may inhibit
high-tech start-ups from obtaining loans and thus look for alternatives for raising capital. Lastly,
SBA loans comprise a small fraction of the loans that are issued to small businesses in the U.S.
(Brown and Earle, 2015).
Regarding the impact of governance mechanisms on survival, our results show a direct positive
impact of duality and independent board members on the startup survival. Our results support
(Scholes, et al., (2013), Daily and Dalton (1992), Daily and Dalton (1993)) that board independency
reduces failure rate in startup firms. Outside directors can provide monitoring knowledge and
experience that contributes to survival (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). This result is opposite to (George
et al., 2005), they attributed the negative impact of outsiders’ board members on survival as risk
taking behavior may be increased as outside directors have greater sector expertise and work
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under pressure from outsider investors to enhance the performance, which may reduce the
likelihood of survival.

9.

Conclusion
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and SLDB (2001) offer two opposing theories on the necessity
and effectiveness of governance system for private firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose
that a governance system is not only unnecessary but may lead to reduction in the firm’s value,
while SLDB (2001) suggest that a governance system is not only necessary but augments a private
firm's value. We contribute to this debate by examining the effect of governance system on the
survivability and performance of the US start-up firms. In this paper, we present evidence in
support of SLDB (2001).
When examining the survival rates of the various forms of organization, which include
Sole Prop, LLC, C Corporation, S Corporation, and Partnership, with partnerships having the
highest survival rates. When we examine the effect of firm governance structures on firm
performance, our results reflect that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional
variations in the performance of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables;
presence of one or more independent board member on the board, separation between the person
holding the CEO position and the chair of the board. When focusing on startup survival, we find
that the presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between CEO and
board chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up firm’s longevity.
Our robustness checks test the effect of firm governance structures on firm performance
measured by return on assets, sales growth, and employment growth. The results from these
robustness checks support our hypotheses. We conclude that our results provide evidence that
firm governance structures impact performance measured by ROE, ROA, sales growth, and
employment growth. Our findings may be useful for organizations that support start-up
ventures, such as business incubators and accelerators, start-up lenders, and venture capitalists.
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The firms included in KFS are skewed towards technology firms. Tracking a wider range
of start-up firms over a longer period of time will add to the current literature. Also, examining
the characteristics of the entrepreneur in terms of altruism would be a great direction for future
research.

30

References
Aksu, B. P., & Wadhwa, A. (2010). Venture Capitalists in Firm Governance: Impact on
Founder Turnover. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 30(4), 1.
Ang, J. S. (2000). Small Business Uniqueness and the Theory of Financial
Management. Small Business: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, 2, 574.

Ben‐Amar, W., & André, P. (2006). Separation of ownership from control and acquiring
firm performance: The case of family ownership in Canada. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 33(3‐4), 517-543.

Bhagat, S. and B. Bolton. 2008. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 14, 257-273.

Blair, E. S., & Marcum, T. M. (2015). Heed Our Advice: Exploring How Professionals
Guide Small Business Owners in Start‐Up Entity Choice. Journal of Small Business
Management, 53(1), 249-265.

Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F. and Thomas, R. (2008), Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance. The Journal of Finance, 63: 1729–1775. doi:10.1111/j.15406261.

Brunninge, O., Nordqvist, M., & Wiklund, J. (2007). Corporate governance and strategic
change in SMEs: The effects of ownership, board composition and top management teams. Small
Business Economics, 29(3), 295-308.

Campbell, T. L., & Frye, M. B. (2009). Venture capitalist monitoring: Evidence from
governance structures. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 265-282.

31

Coleman, S., & Robb, A. (2009). A comparison of new firm financing by gender: evidence
from the Kauffman Firm Survey data. Small Business Economics, 33(4), 397.

Coleman, S., & Robb, A. (2011). Sources of financing for new technology firms: evidence
from the Kauffman firm survey. In The economics of small businesses (pp. 173-194). PhysicaVerlag HD.

Cole, R. A., & Sokolyk, T. (2013). How do start-up firms finance their assets? Evidence
from the Kauffman Firm Surveys.

Cowling, M. (2003). Productivity and corporate governance in smaller firms. Small
Business Economics, 20(4), 335-344.

Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1992). The relationship between governance structure and
corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 7(5), 375-386.

Daily, C. M., & Dollinger, M. J. (1992). An empirical examination of ownership structure
in family and professionally managed firms. Family business review, 5(2), 117-136.

Dutia, S. (2014). Primer for Building an Effective Board for Growing Startup
Companies. Available at SSRN 2445555.

Farhat, J. B., & Robb, A. (2014). Applied Survey Data Analysis Using Stata: The Kauffman
Firm Survey Data. Available at SSRN 2477217.

Fiegener, M. K., Brown, B. M., Dreux, D. R., & Dennis Jr, W. J. (2000). The adoption of
outside boards by small private US firms. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12(4), 291309.

32

Ford, R. H. 1988 Outside directors and the privately-owned firm: are they necessary?
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 13(1): 49- 57.

Ford, R. H. 1992 Boards of Directors and the Privately Owned Firm (New York: Quorum
Books).

Fried, V. H., Bruton, G. D. and Hisrich, R. D. (1998) Strategy and the board of directors in
venture capital-backed firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 13: 493-503.

Gabrielsson, J. (2003). Boards and governance in SMEs: An inquiry into boards’
contribution to firm performance. Lund University.

Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2005). Outside directors in SME boards: A call for theoretical
reflections. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 1(1), 28-37.

Gabrielsson, J. and Winlund, H. (2000). Boards of directors in small and medium sized
industrial firms: examining the effects of the board’s working style on board task performance,
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12: 311-330

George, G. (2005). Slack resources and the performance of privately held firms. Academy
of Management Journal, 48(4), 661-676.

Gompers, P. A. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture
capital. The journal of finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.

Górriz, C. G., & Fumás, V. S. (1996). Ownership structure and firm performance: Some
empirical evidence from Spain. Managerial and Decision Economics, 575-586.

33

Grundei, J., & Talaulicar, T. (2002). Company law and corporate governance of start-ups
in Germany: Legal stipulations, managerial requirements, and modification strategies. Journal of
Management and Governance, 6(1), 1-27.

He, Lerong., Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation, governance
structure and firm performance, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2008, Pages
257-279, ISSN 0883-9026.

Hochberg, Y. V. (2016). Accelerating Entrepreneurs and Ecosystems: The Seed Accelerator
Model. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 16(1), 25-51.

Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. S. (1994). Sticking it out: Entrepreneurial
survival and liquidity constraints. Journal of Political economy, 102(1), 53-75.

Huse,

M.

(2000).

Boards

of

directors

in

SMEs:

A

review

and

research

agenda. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12(4), 271-290.

Ivanov, V. I., & Masulis, R. W. (2008, June). Strategic alliances and corporate governance
in newly public firms: Evidence from corporate venture capital. In EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings
Paper.

Johannisson, B. And Huse, M. (2000) Recruiting outside board members in the small
family business: an ideological challenge, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12(4):
353-378.

Jensen, M. C., & Mechling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.

34

Landström, H, Frank, H. and Veciana, J.M. (1997) Entrepreneurship and small business
research in Europe: an ECSB Survey. Aldershot: Averbury.

Lowrey, Ying, Startup Business Characteristics and Dynamics: A Data Analysis of the
Kauffman Firm Survey (August 15, 2009). RAND Working Paper Series WR. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1496545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1496545

Lynall, M.D., Golden, B.R. and Hillman, A.J. (2003) Board composition from adolescence
to maturity: A multi-theoretical view, Academy of Management Review, forthcoming in Special
Forum “Corporate Governance, July 2003.

Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006), Family Governance and Firm Performance:
Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities. Family Business Review, 19: 73–87. doi:10.1111/j.17416248.

Mustakallio, M., Autio, E., & Zahra, S. A. (2002). Relational and contractual governance in
family firms: Effects on strategic decision making. Family business review, 15(3), 205-222.

Nash, J.M. (1988) Boards of privately held companies: Their responsibilities and structure,
Family Business Review, 1(3): 263-269.

Nordqvist, M. (2005). Understanding the role of ownership in strategizing: A study of
family firms. JIBS Dissertation Series 029. Jönköping, Sweden: Jönköping International Business
School.

Politis, D. and Landström, H. (2002) Informal investors as entrepreneurs – the
development of an entrepreneurial career, Venture Capital, 4(2): 78-101.

35

Robb, A., & Reynolds, P. D. (2009). PSED II and the Kauffman firm survey. In New Firm
Creation in the United States (pp. 279-302). Springer, New York, NY.

Schanz, S. J. (2007). Entrepreneurial selection and use of legal counsel. New England
Journal of Entrepreneurship, 10(2), 59-63.

Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R., & Buchholtz, A. (2001). Agency relationships in family
firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12(2), 99–116.

Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003). Exploring the agency consequences
of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms. Academy of Management
Journal, 46(2), 179-194.

Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2002). Altruism, agency, and the
competitiveness of family firms. Managerial and decision economics, 23(4‐5), 247-259.

Van Auken, H., Kaufmann, J., & Herrmann, P. (2009). An empirical analysis of the
relationship between capital acquisition and bankruptcy laws. Journal of Small Business
Management, 47(1), 23-37.

Thompson, P. (2005). Selection and firm survival: evidence from the shipbuilding
industry, 1825–1914. The review of economics and statistics, 87(1), 26-36.

Uhlaner, L. M., Floren, R. H., & Geerlings, J. R. (2007). Owner commitment and relational
governance in the privately-held firm: An empirical study. Small Business Economics, 29(3), 275293.

36

Uhlaner, L., Wright, M., & Huse, M. (2007). Private firms and corporate governance: An
integrated economic and management perspective. Small Business Economics, 29(3), 225-241.

Welsh, D. H., Desplaces, D. E., & Davis, A. E. (2011). A comparison of retail franchises,
independent businesses, and purchased existing independent business startups: Lessons from
the Kauffman firm survey. Journal of Marketing Channels, 18(1), 3-18.

Welter, F., & Lasch, F. (2008). Entrepreneurship research in Europe: Taking stock and
looking forward. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(2), 241-248.

Zahra, S. A., Neubaum, D. O., & Naldi, L. (2007). The effects of ownership and governance
on SMEs’ international knowledge-based resources. Small Business Economics, 29(3), 309-327.

Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.

37

CHAPTER 2
Exploring the Nexus Between Governance, Entrepreneurial Orientation, Performance, and
Survival: Evidence from U.S. startups

1. Introduction

Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) describes how a firm's entrepreneurial attributes (i.e.,
innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness) shape its
performance as well as survival. In recent years, EO has invited a significant amount of empirical
work, with the main focus being on the effect of entrepreneurial decision making on the
performance and survival of a private enterprise. The conclusions of this line of research have
often been conflicting: some researchers find that there is a strong relationship between EO and
performance, implying that a small business that starts with a strong EO will perform better than
the one that does not (see, for example, Hult, Snow & Kandemir (2003), while others report lower
or even no significant correlations between EO and performance (George, 2011).
The principal reason for the conflicting results might lie in the exclusion of factors that
potentially moderate the EO-performance relationship, especially external factors such as
environmental conditions (Barney 1991, Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marin 2005).

More

recently, a new branch of research has evolved proposing that the EO performance relationship
is contingent on the degree of governance, specifically, the degree of separation in ownership,
management, and control (Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Madison et al., 2014; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
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Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes (2012) raise a question about the direct relationship between
individual EO dimensions and performance in small business enterprises. Top managers and
directors also tend to have the longer business horizon in decision making, and this may influence
their pursuit of first-mover advantages through innovation, proactiveness, and risk-taking
(Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Zahra et al., 2004; Zellweger & Sieger, 2012). Lumpkin and Dess (1996)
additionally argue that the dimensions of EO may vary independently, which implies that the
effect of individual dimensions of EO on firm performance should be emphasized.
The main focus of this paper is on the building of relationships between governance and
the individual dimensions of EO, giving systematic explanations for the moderating effects of
individual dimensions of EO on the governance–performance relationship in transitional
economies. More specifically, from empirical results about different moderating effects of the
dimensions of EO on the governance–performance relationship, we offer more fine-tuned
insights on this issue. Moreover, although existing studies have suggested that entrepreneurial
movements can help first movers to acquire both temporary and sustained high performance
(Zahra, 1991, Zahra & Covin, 1995Wiklund, 1999, and Zahra & Covin, 1995), empirical evidence
on this proposition is still limited. This study fills the void by considering longitudinal data to
test both the short run and sustaining effects of startup governance on the EO- performancesurvival link.
Besides incorporating environmental condition (in terms of governance system), this
paper is an improvement as it eschews some shortcomings inherent in the existing EO research.
First, researchers differ in their definition of each element of the EO. This paper does not depend
on the unambiguous definition of EO attributes. Second, EO factors are derived based on
interpretations of response to questions contained in the Kaufman survey. , The responses are
subjective and do not lend themselves to quantifiable measures. Governance factors, although
obtained from the same survey are straightforward, unambiguous, and, easy to measures. Third,
the information on governance factors can be easily obtained independently of the Kaufman's
survey.
A major contribution of this paper, therefore, is to present a link between the EO factors
and governance factors to identify objective measures that are likely to influence the performance
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and survival of an entrepreneur. Another potentially significant contribution of the paper is to
weigh in on the continuing debate of whether a good governance system adds to or detracts from
the value of a small business. On the one hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that a
governance system is unnecessary (because the conflicts of interest between the owner and the
manager do not exist) and as such, it might be value reducing. On the other hand, Schulze,
Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001 (hereafter SLDB) argue private owners' preferences are
expressed in economic as well as non-economic terms. According to SLDB, a major source of the
non-economically motivated behavior is altruism which "allows the individual to simultaneously
satisfy both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic (self-regarding) preferences" (p.
102). SLDB (2001) suggest that a good governance system is needed for private firms as well to
reign in the non-economic preferences that are likely to have a negative effect a firm's
performance.
The paper proceeds along the following lines. Section 2 provides a broad survey of EO
literature and how EO might affect a firm’s performance as well as its survival. Section 3 develops
hypotheses, section 4 for the analysis and results.

2. Literature Survey
Over the last two decades, an increasing amount of research has integrated the areas of
EO and private firms (Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Lumpkin et al., 2010; Zahra, 1991). However,
earlier studies rarely examine how governance is connected to EO in explaining firm
performance. In this section, a) we review the literature on the relationship between EO and firm
performance, and survival, b) propose a link between the governance and EO and c) develop
testable hypotheses.

2.1. Entrepreneurial Orientation
EO is a strategy-making process that characterizes an organization's entrepreneurship.
Prior studies use two major approaches in conceptualizing EO: the composite dimension
approach presented by Covin and Slevin (1989) and the multidimensional approach posited by
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Lumpkin and Dess (1996). In the composite dimension approach, EO represents a unidimensional
construct

characterized

by

innovativeness,

risk-taking,

and

proactiveness.

In

the

multidimensional approach, EO is characterized by innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking,
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Specifically, innovation
keeps firms ahead of their competitors and gains competitive advantages; proactiveness gives
firms the ability to present new products and services to the market before their competitors
(Wiklund, 1999); while risky strategies lead to a higher long-term mean performance despite
some projects failing while others experience short-term success (Wiklund & Shephard, 2005). All
these innovation efforts lead to improved financial results for firms.
Miller (1983) argues that an entrepreneurial firm is willing to engage in the innovation of
products and technological processes, to provide proactive innovations to pursue first-mover
advantages, and to undertake risky ventures. Most past research on EO follows the composite
dimension approach, summing across all aspects of EO to create a single variable. But such a
unidimensional construct does not adequately represent the various factors involved in
entrepreneurial processes and their varying impact on performance outcomes. We agree with
Gartner (1985) that the creation of a new business is a multidimensional strategy and we,
therefore, utilize the multidimensional approach in our examination of EO in this study.

2.2. EO and firm performance
Many studies in the field of entrepreneurship focus on understanding the
relationship between EO and organizational performance because of the belief that firms with
strong EO perform much better than those that do not adopt an EO (Covin & Slevin, 1986; Hult
et al., 2003; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). However, assessing the magnitude of this relationship
has yielded mixed results. Some studies report lower correlations or even no significant
relationship between EO and performance (Covin, Slevin & Schultz, 1994; Lumpkin & Dess,
2001). These findings convey the important message that is simply examining the direct
relationship between EO and performance provides an incomplete picture of this domain.
A few recent studies have shifted some focus to the indirect relationship between EO and
performance. Catherine and Wang (2008) propose that learning orientation is one of the missing
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links in the EO–performance relationship. Li et al. (2009) use survey data to examine the
mediating role of the knowledge creation process. Other studies focus on the role of exploratory
capabilities in the relationship of EO and performance (Lisboa, Skarmeas & Lages, 2011). But none
of these explorations have paid sufficient attention to governance variables, which is an essential
part of entrepreneurship success. Governance can result in sustainable changes in a firm's
activities and decision-making process. Effective activities and processes are required to cope
with such changes and attain superior performance. Based on this reasoning, we propose that
governance pattern, a key concept that describes the control and monitoring of the startup, may
be a missing link in the examination of the EO performance relationship.
Conflict research regarding the impact of each of the EO dimensions on firm performance
have aroused, according to Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes (2012) Innovative SMEs do perform
better in turbulent environments, but those innovative SMEs should minimize the level of risk
and should take action to avoid projects that are too risky. McCann, Leon-Guerrero, & Haley
(2001) suggest that family firms that invest in entrepreneurship and innovation have more
significant potential for high performance. They found that The positive influence of EO on
performance is related to the first-mover advantages and the tendency to take advantages of
emerging opportunities implied by EO. Specifically, innovation keeps firms ahead of their
competitors and gains competitive advantages; proactiveness gives firms the ability to present
new products/services to the market ahead of competitors. According to (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996;
Wiklund, 1999) an entrepreneurial firm is willing to engage in the innovation of products and
technological processes, to provide proactive innovations to pursue first-mover advantages, and
to undertake risky ventures. This, in turn, will elevate their performance.
Autonomy also has been positively proven to impact the firm performance. Employee
involvement shapes their understanding of top managers' willingness to facilitate and support
entrepreneurial behavior. When coupled with a voluntary acceptance of work discretion and
autonomy, the EO of the firm would be expected to be more effective (Hornsby et al., 2002).
Kemelgor (2002) argue that there is a strong relationship between EO, measured by its network,
and performance, and that team's intra- and extra-industry networks and autonomy influence
the performance of new ventures.
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Evidence regarding risk-taking and firm performance is conflicted, Kraus, Rigtering, and
Hughes (2012) find that the interaction term of risk-taking was significantly but negatively related
to SME business performance. Also, proactiveness was directly related to a multidimensional
measure of business performance (Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes, 2012; Becherer and Maurer,
1999). Proactiveness was positively and significantly related to change in sales (growth), while no
significant relationship was found with change in profits. Becherer and Maurer (1999) suggested
that ‘‘proactive leaders are growing the firm as a strategic approach to the marketplace".
Finally, Martin and Lumpkin (2003) suggest that a new entry that is an imitation of an
existing product or service would be considered entrepreneurial if the move implies an
aggressive, head-to-head confrontation in the market, as later generations in family firms assume
control and focus more on value and profitability than on directly challenging competitors to gain
market share, the level of competitive aggressiveness decreases as well as the ability to maintain
a market share.

2.3. EO and firm survival
In an environment of rapid change and shortened product and business model life cycles,
future profit streams from existing operations are uncertain, requiring businesses to constantly
seek new opportunities. Therefore, firms may benefit from adopting EO (Rauch et al. 2009). Partly
in contrast to these claims of the pivotal role of EO for organizational success, Success is often
defined in broader terms, including nonfinancial performance or the survival of the firm.
Research on entrepreneurship in firms that have survived and prospered for long periods of time
is divided as to whether these organizations represent a context where entrepreneurship
flourishes or is hampered (e.g., Naldi et al. 2007). Entrepreneurship Orientation is seen as critical
to firm’s success and survival across generations (Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006; Rogoff and
Heck 2003; Salvato 2004). It refers to entrepreneurial activities within organizations that are
designed to revitalize the company’s business and to establish sustainable competitive
advantages that help them survive and live longer (cp. Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006; Kuratko
et al. 2005; Zahra 1995, 1996).
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Regarding innovation impact on small firm survival, Younger and smaller family firms
are more likely to be innovative than older, larger family firms and live longer. Furthermore,
innovativeness is having greater potential for high performance, if it is driven by comprehensive
strategic decision-making and long-term orientation (McCann et al. (2001)). Also, Autonomy is
important regarding long-term entrepreneurial performance and survival, Nordqvist et al. (2008)
suggest considering autonomy as having both an external (autonomy from stakeholders such as
banks, suppliers, customers, and financial markets) and an internal (empowering individuals and
teams within an organization) dimension. Hence, literature seems to propose that, while
autonomy may be seen as an important factor of corporate entrepreneurship, both internal and
external autonomy need to be considered for long-lived firms.
As outlined in the definition of EO, regarding the risk-taking impact on firm success and
survival, ambiguous findings of levels of risk-taking in firms may be related to the inconsistent
use of definitions and measures (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Morck and Yeung 2003). Martin and
Lumpkin (2003) investigate risk regarding investing personal assets and making loans to the
business, tolerance of debt, and the importance of increasing profitability. Other authors
investigate willingness to innovate (Benson 1991), the variation of performance outcomes
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007), or debt levels (leverage) as a measure of control risk (Mishra and
McConaughy 1999). Drawing on this confusion, Zahra (2005) claims that a broader definition of
risk-taking is needed, as it is a complex construct with presumably multiple dimensions.
Across different studies, all firms should be very ‘‘cautious with debt capital’’ to avoid the
risk of losing control over the company (control risk), the more they financed investments with
their cash flow, the better was their survival probabilities (Mishra and McConaughy 1999). We
rely on the assumption that lower levels of EO, specifically the more of risk-taking dimension,
should endanger organizational survival and prosperity (e.g., Covin et al. 2006; Dess et al. 2003;
Wiklund 2006; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005).
Inconsistent findings exist in the literature regarding the relevance of proactiveness in the
context of family firms. Nordqvist et al. (2008) argue that family firms are more inclined to be
proactive. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) view proactiveness as the organizational pursuit
of favorable business opportunities and can lead to first-mover advantages and higher economic

44

profits, and long life of the firm. In contrast, Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that proactiveness
does not seem to be a consistent predictor of family firm success (growth and survival), and they
were not able to prove that proactiveness decreases with later generations in family firms.
Zellweger and Sieger (2010) research the proactiveness in family firms suggesting that the firm
dynamic pattern regarding the level of proactiveness over time heavily affect their life, they show
that long-lived firms have longer periods of rather low levels of proactiveness, interrupted by
phases of carefully selected proactive moves.
Competitiveness is also seen to be a positive factor affecting firm survival, as a new entry
that imitates an existing product or service would be considered entrepreneurial if the move
implies an aggressive, head-to-head confrontation in the market, as later generations in family
firms assume control and focus more on value and profitability than on directly challenging
competitors to gain market share, the level of competitive aggressiveness decreases as well as the
ability to maintain a market share (Martin and Lumpkin, 2003).

3. Hypotheses Development: Linking Governance and EO
3.1. Innovativeness
Innovativeness refers to a "firm's tendency to engage in and support new ideas, novelty,
experimentation, and creative processes that may result in new products, services, or
technological processes" (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The extant literature presents numerous
ways to classify innovation, including continuous versus discontinuous, incremental versus
radical, and technical versus administrative. But perhaps the most general classification is
technological innovation versus product-market innovation.
The agency costs approach predicts that diffuse equity ownership negatively affects
corporate innovation activity because it enables the managers to pursue their objectives, such as
increasing their wealth and prestige, to the detriment of projects that increase profits. Indeed,
since the costs of monitoring exceed the benefits, small dispersed shareholders do not have
incentives to monitor management behavior (Berle and Means, 1932; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, Cho (1998) cautions researchers that
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corporate ownership and innovation activity may be linked in a two-way relationship. Cho (1998)
performs a simultaneous regression using data on 230 Fortune 500 manufacturing firms (for the
year 1991) and shows that, whereas ownership structure affects R&D spending, the R&D
spending affects the corporate value and, in turn, ownership structure. This may cast doubt on
the empirical results obtained by assuming that the ownership structure is exogenously
determined.
Based on agency theory, corporate governance research assumes that various ownership
constituencies have homogeneous preferences for corporate strategies such as new product
innovation. Research has shown that firm leverage has a negative relationship with investments
in R&D (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Alternatively, equity holders
have a residual claimant status and therefore generally have a stronger interest in projects using
firm-specific resources (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). Separate ownership constituencies have some
different preferences in governance. These results suggest that ownership constituencies may not
be directly substitutable as monitors of the firms, especially firms emphasizing corporate
innovation strategies. Thus, agency theory should be amended to suggest that not all owners are
alike in relationship to governance approaches and innovation strategies.

Concentrated

ownership is found to be positively affecting innovation for many reasons; it reduces agency costs
and disciplines managers' behavior (Hill and Snell (1988), Holmstrom (1989), Baysinger et al.
(1991), Francis and Smith (1995)), favors financial commitments and organizational integration
(Lacetera, 2001), makes reputation constraints tighter and favors long-term relations (Mayer
(1997), Miozzo and Dewick (2002)), exacerbates asymmetric bargaining power problems
(Battaggion and Tajoli (2001)), favors managers' flexibility and specialization (Ortega-Argile ́s et
al., 2005), and according to nonlinear relationship depending on country characteristics (Lee,
2005).
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue that boards dominated by outside directors may
lead firms to reduce investment in the development of internal innovation and focus more on
product diversification and external innovation through acquisitions. Outside directors, given
their time and information processing constraints, are likely to use financial rather than the
strategic evaluation of managers. Hoskisson et al., (2001) suggest that when inside directors are
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dominant, firms focus on internal innovation in firms that report R&D expenditures. Findings
suggest that inside directors prefer internal innovation (Zahra, 1996) and (Li and Simerly, 1998),
thus, outside directors likely perceive less risk associated with external innovation than internal
innovation, at least partly, because of the asymmetric information between outside and inside
directors. Equity finance positively affects innovation because it helps risk management and
financial commitments, and reduces asymmetric information problems (Bradley et al. (1984),
Long and Malitz (1985), Williamson (1988), Gugler (2001), Carpenter and Petersen (2002),
Lazonick (2007)). Therefore, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial innovativeness.
3.2. Autonomy
Autonomy refers to "the independent action of an individual or team in bringing forth an
idea or vision and carrying it through to completion" (Lumpkin et al.,1996). In an organizational
context, autonomy refers to organizational members acting and making decisions independently.
Autonomy may vary with firm size. Past studies have examined the extent of autonomous
behavior in small firms by investigating the level of centralization. For example, (Dill, 1958)
higher autonomy was associated with less complex task assignments, lower risk, more control
over information flows, and more formalized interaction. Miller (1983) finds that high levels of
entrepreneurial activities are associated with the most autonomous leaders who have strong
central authority in small firms. White (1986) found that certain strategies that require high levels
of control produce better results with low rather than with high autonomy. Shrivastava and Grant
(1985) find that this high level of entrepreneurial activities also has a strong reliance on
managerial autocracy. Some studies indicate that firms with autonomous leaders can overcome
organizational resistance promptly, for example, by submitting market ideas directly to top
management and communicating with all parties effectively. Therefore, we can infer that
autonomy facilitates innovation speed through centralization in small firms.

In traditional small business literature, the concept of small firms’ governance includes
ownership, management, and control (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Prior studies have found that
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the advantages of private firms in mitigating agency problems are more likely to be realized when
ownership is combined with active management and control; in contrast, under passive
governance, such potential advantages are less likely to be realized (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chu,
2011). Following this notion, this study examines whether EO indeed magnifies the positive
association between governance and firm performance. Autonomy as captured in the EO
construct refers to the ‘‘independent action of an individual or a team in bringing forth an idea
or a vision and carrying it through to completion’’ (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, p. 140), that is, the
ability and will to be self-directed in the pursuit of opportunities. In governance context, it may
lead to the separation of the CEO and the chair of a board (duality), where the CEO cannot remain
free to act independently, to make key decisions.
Active governance in single firms would be presented in the firm's CEO plays dual roles
as the Chair of the board. Duality is a common phenomenon for single-family firms. According
to (Daily and Dalton, 1992), maintaining control is essential, in most cases, the founder-manager
would serve as both CEO and board chairperson. Otherwise, there exists some risk of divided
authority. On the other hand, the multifamily firm will likely avoid duality as it can cause the
concentration of power to one person who might use it in the opposite of the interests of others,
especially in the absence of an independent board. Thus active governance in multifamily firms
exhibits a lower incidence of duality than single-family firms and therefore lower autonomy.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial autonomy

3.3. Risk-taking
Miller and Friesen (1982) define risk-taking as “the degree to which managers are willing
to make large and risky resource commitments, that is, those which have a reasonable chance of
costly failures.” There are two implications in this definition, both of which are necessary for
understanding how risk-taking is influenced by governance. First, firms with an EO tend to
engage in risk-taking behavior, such as incurring heavy debt or making large resource
commitments. Second, such investments demonstrate that top management has an intense
commitment to achievement and prospects for the positive outcome.
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There are more arguments in the literature that could justify a positive association
between governance and corporate risk-taking. First, in poor governance firms, management may
obtain nontrivial cash flows and enjoy substantial private benefits from the firms that they control
(e.g., Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005), Stulz (2005)). Their high exposure may lead them to
be conservative in directing corporate investment and thus less risk-taking. Second, non-equity
stakeholders such as banks, governments, and organized labor, which often prefer conservative
corporate investment, may influence investment policy for their benefit. Their influence is higher
in low highly corporate governance environments (e.g., Morck and Nakamura (1999), Tirole
(2001), Roe (2003)).
On the other hand, the literature also offers justification for a negative association between
governance and risk-taking. First, when governance improves there is less fear of expropriation
by managers and consequently less need for concentrated ownership (Burkart, Panunzi, and
Shleifer (2003)). (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). The ownership concentration may result in
management implementing conservative investment policies. This may result in a negative
relation between governance and risk-taking. Second, in weaker investor protection locations
firms have dominant owners who may control a pyramid of firms (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung
(2005), Stulz (2005)). The dominant owner may instruct lower-layer units to take excess risks and
tunnel gains to upper-layer units leaving lower-level units to absorb any potential losses. Thus,
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial risk-taking.

3.4. Proactiveness
Although proactiveness is a characteristic of firms that are the first to introduce new
products or services, some researchers have found that the second firm to enter a new market can
be just as pioneering as the first entrant and just as likely to achieve success via proactiveness
(Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman,1978). Therefore, proactiveness refers to firms that have the will
to be a leader and the foresight to seize new opportunities, even if they are not always the first to
enter the market. In an entrepreneurial context, proactiveness refers to the way firms relate to
market opportunities in the process of new entry.
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There is a broad debate about whether governance protection afforded to managers is
beneficial to the firm (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005) under the viewpoint that protected managers
tend to be sheltered from the market fluctuations, which leads to inferior firm performance
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). Also, the vast majority of studies find that corporate
governance factors might affect the entry mode decision. Both internalization theory (McManus,
1972; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) and the resource-based view
(Teece et al., 1997; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) see proactiveness as the
primary means for firms to appropriate rents in overseas markets from the exploitation of their
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. Therefore, we can hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial proactiveness.

3.5. Competitive aggressiveness
Competitive aggressiveness is characterized by responsiveness, which involves adapting
to competitors' challenges. Competitively aggressive firms often respond to such challenges with
head-to-head confrontation. Competitive aggressiveness may also reflect a willingness to
compete using unconventional methods, such as analyzing and targeting competitors'
weaknesses (Stuart & Abetti, 1987) and adopting unconventional tactics to challenge industry’s
leaders (Cooper, Willard & Woo, 1986).
Managers may prefer growth to profits (empire building may bring prestige or higher
salaries), may be lazy or fraudulent ("shirk"), and may maintain costly labor or product standards
above the necessary competitive minimum, thereby reducing individual incentives to exercise
rights and creating the preference for exit (Eisenhardt, 1989). Similarly, interfirm ownership may
create networks that condition business competition, cooperation, and innovation (Whitley,
1999).
Competition may both influence and be influenced by governance systems, the
effectiveness of various types of governance systems may be impacted by the degree of product
market competition and the extension of competition (Mayer, 1997). He also suggests that Firms
that receive a larger fraction of their debt financing from one lender invest, sell more and are more
competitive, in addition, The structure of boards (role of non-executives, separate chairs and chief
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executives, and remuneration, audit, and nominating committees.) affect the way in which
companies are managed and controlled and their completive behavior. There exists a positive
relationship between ownership structure and competitiveness; Small private firms tend to have
better competitiveness than public firms (Zhang et al., 2000). Therefore:

Hypothesis 5: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial, competitive aggressiveness

Figure 2 depicts the linkage between governance factors and EO factors. It represents the
conceptual model of moderating entrepreneurial orientation in the relationship between the
governance structure and firm performance and survival. The direct relationship between
governance and the five EO factors represents the five-main hypothesis in the study. The second
set of direct relationships is between the five EO factors and performance and survival. While the
main indirect relationship is between Governance and performance/survival through the impact
of EO factors.

Figure 2: Conceptual framework for the direct and indirect relationship between EO and firm performance and survival through
governance

As shown in figure 2, we build some expectations on the relationship between governance
variables and each of the EO factors as shown in table 1. Table 1 summarizes the expected
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relations between the governance variables and the EO dimensions with an explanation for the
sign relationship between each of them.

Table 11: Diagram of Governance-EO-linkage

Table 1 shows the linkage between the governance variables; leverage, duality, outside director and
ownership, and the EO factors; innovativeness, autonomy, risk taking, proactiveness, competitiveness.
GOV
SIGN
EO
COMMENTS
PROXIES

ATTRIBUTES
-

Innovativeness

Debt finance negatively affects innovation because it puts constraints on the firm’s
ability to take on risky innovation;

-

Autonomy

Debt finance negatively affect autonomy as it reduces managers autonomy in making
decisions

LEVERAGE

-

Risk Taking

Debt financing decreases a firm’s risk-taking ability

-

Proactiveness

Higher debt financing might restrict the firm’s ability to lead the market and be
proactive

+

Competitiveness

Firms that receive a larger proportion of their debt financing from one lender invest,
sell more, and are more competitive.

-

Innovativeness

When positions of the CEO and chairman are held by the same person, the directors
are less likely to be independent and therefore might be less effective in
innovativeness. However, it may limit the benefits from hiring the best existing
professional managers that can have particularly large for innovative activities.

+

Autonomy

When the same person holds both board chair and CEO positions he/she can exercise
more autonomy;

DUALITY

-/+

Risk Taking

A board dominated by dual CEO and chair will be more effective in controlling
opportunistic managerial risk-taking behavior.
In some cases, duality can lead to more risk-taking.

-

Proactiveness

Duality tends to cause avoidance of proactiveness due to more monitoring of activities
and risk avoidance.

+

Competitiveness

As competitiveness requires faster decisions, Dual leadership allows firms to make
speedier decisions and react more quickly to new information than separate
leadership.

+

Innovativeness

OUTSIDE
DIRECTOR

Independent board positively affects innovation because it reduces agency costs and
disciplines managers’ behavior

-

Autonomy

Independent board reduces manager control and thus lowers autonomy

-/+

Risk Taking

Independent directors allow managers greater discretion to reduce risk-taking.
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N/A
+

Proactiveness

Independent directors have a neutral impact on proactiveness

Competitiveness

Independent board affect the way in which companies are managed and controlled
and thus their completive behavior

OWNERSHIP
(number of

+

Innovativeness

Higher # of owners might promote innovation.

+

Autonomy

Higher number is likely to have less autonomy

+/-

Risk Taking

Higher number may support higher risk-

+

Proactiveness

higher number might slow down proactiveness

+

Competitiveness

Higher number might increase competitive ability

owners)

4. Sample, Variables, and Data
4.1. Sample
We utilize Kauffman Survey Data (KFS) which tracks a sample of firms from their
inceptions through their first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from
2004 until 2011. The data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy,
innovation, organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owneroperators are defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the
day-to-day operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating
assistance" (Farhat and Robb, 2014).

The sampling frame for the KFS is based on the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database and
restricted to businesses (or enterprises) that are reported by D&B as starting in 2004. This database
is a compilation of data from various sources, including credit bureaus, state oﬃces that register
some new businesses, and companies (e.g., credit card and shipping companies) that are likely to
be used by all businesses. Importantly, this is not the same database as the D&B business registry
available on the Internet; the sample from which our data are drawn contains vastly greater
coverage of ﬁrms in the United States. The KFS data includes an oversample of high-tech ﬁrms;
thus, all of our analyses use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the
frame from which the sample was drawn.
4.2. Variables
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4.2.1. Dependent variables
4.2.1.1. Performance
Because these companies are privately-held, market performance measures are not
available. Therefore, we rely on the accounting measures of performance discussed below:
•

ROA: Net income/average total assets, using the average assets based on the
average of beginning and end of year assets;

•

ROE: Net income/average equity, where average equity is based on the average of
beginning and end of year equity.

•

Employment growth: measured by the increase in the employment percentage
over the life of the firm.

•

Sales Growth: measured by the growth in the firm sales over the years.

4.2.1.2. Survival
Measured by the binary variable of survival as of 0 and 1 of the firm through the eight years of
the survey.
4.2.2. Independent variables: Governance structure
We included the main governance factors in the private firms; ownership structure (single
vs. Multiple), Duality, Independent Directors and Leverage. Where:
•

Ownership structure is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is
owned by a single owner (i.e., proprietor) and zero if the firm is owned by multiple
owners ;

•

Board structure is proxied by the presence of one or more independent directors on
the board. Outsiders on the board of directors is any director who is unrelated to the
family. We use a dummy variable to capture the essence of this variable: it takes a
value of 1 if the board has an independent director, zero otherwise.

•

For sources of financing, we employ several proxies :
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o

Ratio of debt to equity= Measured using the median leverage of all firms and
ranking firms as above and below the median.

o

Financing via owners

o

Financing via a bank loan

o

Financing via government finance; and

o

Financing via venture capital

4.2.3. Moderating variables: Entrepreneurial Orientation
EO has five dimensions; innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, competitive
aggressiveness, and autonomy. Multiple questions developed in Kauffman Survey are used to
measure each of these EO elements. Two question phrases are exploited. The respondents are
asked to report their EO in a follow-up of eight years (2004-2011) by giving a dummy answer of
1 or 0, where the one presents the strength of the EO in the firm.
4.2.4. Control variables:
To control for the effects of variables that may have an important influence on both
performance and survival, we include three control variables: firm age, firm size, and industry.
Resources vary significantly depending on the size of the firm. Resource-based theory affirms
that firm resources are the most valuable source of their competitive advantage and excellence
(Barney, 1991). For small enterprises, the respective economies of scale are constrained by the
limited resources, putting them at a disadvantage where growth is concerned (Aragón-Sánchez
and Sánchez-Marin 2005).
4.2.5. Variable definition and computation:
On Table 2, we show the definition of the five EO factors and the questions used to
measure them. For each variable, we used two to three questions from the KFS survey that was
mostly related to the factor definition (Appendix 1).
Table 12: Variable definition and measurement
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Table 2 shows the definition used for each of the EO variables including innovation, autonomy, risktaking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness.

Variable

Definition

Innovativeness The firm's likelihood to promote and support original ideas, experimentation,
and creative processes that may lead to new products, services, or technological
processes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). We measure it by three questions in the
survey.
Autonomy

An individual or team's independent action in bringing an idea or vision and
implementing it through to completion (Lumpkin et al.,1996). In an
organizational context, autonomy refers to organizational members acting and
making decisions independently. We measure it by three questions in the
survey.

Risk-taking

The degree that managers are willing to make substantial and risky resource
commitments, which have a reasonable chance of costly failures. We measure it
as the total external debt to the total external equity.

Proactiveness

The willingness of the firm to be a leader and the foresight to seize new
opportunities, even if they are not always the first to enter the market. In an
entrepreneurial context, proactiveness refers to the way firms relate to market
opportunities in the process of new entry.

Competitive

The willingness to compete using unconventional methods, such as analyzing

aggressiveness

and targeting competitors' weaknesses (Stuart & Abetti, 1987) and adopting
unconventional tactics to challenge industry’s leaders (Cooper, Willard & Woo,
1986).

4.3. Data Sources
We use Kauffman Survey Data which tracks a sample of firms from their start through their
first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from 2004 until 2011. The
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data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy, innovation,
organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owner-operators
are defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the dayto-day operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating
assistance" (Farhat and Robb, 2014). Several studies have used KFS data to further understand
new firm characteristics, such as analyzing the financing of new firms (Coleman and Robb,
2009; 2011; Cole and Sokolyk, 2013), comparisons of different types of new firms (Welsh,
Desplaces, and Davis, 2011), and firm survival (Robb and Reynolds, 2009).

The KFS is based on a random sample of businesses--from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB)
database, which was created in 2004. The design for the questionnaires for the sample was
done by Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was delivered in 2004, and
follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far adding to the baseline are
three following waves consisting of 2005, 2006 and 2007 data. The development and change
aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries motivated the Foundation to
oversample firms in these fields. The screening/eligibility test allowed only 15 percent of the
potential pool of firms to be part of the sample. The initial sample of firms passed "the
eligibility test" defining a new business in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms out of an initial
pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents were paid $50 to answer using a self- administered
web survey or a computer-assisted telephone interview.

Eligibility for inclusion in the data was determined by two tests. The firm must be a new
company and must be a company created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first
test confirms that the company had started its activity in 2004. Thus, if the firm had started
activity before 2004, the firm was not included in the sample. The second test confirmed the
ownership and provenance of the firm. The firm cannot be a subsidiary of any other business
and cannot be a spin-off, nor be inherited by previous owners. Finally, the firm cannot be a
not-for-profit company. Firms that passed both tests were included in the sample in the
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baseline questionnaire and corresponding follow-ups. The baseline questionnaire records
data at the birth of the firm, and thus is used as the main operational conditions in the study.

There are four waves available in the current Kauffman Firm Survey. Firms that are included
in the first wave satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be part of the sample and
survive the first year of activity. The first wave found that 7.4 percent (6 percent plus 1.4
percent) of the 4,928 (369) were out of business by the end of 2005. There were 4,523 businesses
left in 2005. More businesses were found have closed by the time of the second and third
follow-ups. Some of the surviving firms chose not to answer, and sample weights were
adjusted accordingly.

5. Results
5.1. Summary Statistics
The following table (3) presents the summary statistics for the data based on the forms of
organization (Panel A), Industry Classification (Panel B), and survival rate (Panel C) as of
2011. On panel A, the sample is classified based on the form of organization, showing that
partnership has the highest percentage of duality – the separation between CEO and the board
chair- while sole Proprietorship has the lowest percentage of 7%. Regarding the independent
board, partnership again shows the highest percentage of having independent members on
their board of directors, while sole Proprietorship has the lowest percentage of 18%. Limited
liability corporations show the lowest percentage of using debt compared to equity in their
financing options. While partnership has the highest ratio of 63%.

On Panel (B), we classify the sample based on the industry as high tech, medium tech, and
low tech. The results show that low tech industry has highest duality percentage. While the
high tech firms have the highest independent board percentage as well as using of leverage.
On panel (C), the sample is classified based on survival, showing that firms who survived as
of 2011 have the highest percentages of using duality and independent members on the board.
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While those who did not survive seems to have more usage of debt in their capital structure.
Panel D shows the classification based on form size as total assets where the first group with
a size of less than $10,000 represents 40% of the sample, 39% for the second size group
between $10,000 and $100,000. And 21% of the last group with total assets more than $100,000.
In terms of governance factors, the third group with the largest size tend to have the highest
duality ratio as well as independent board and leverage. While the smallest size group shows
the lowest percentage of all governance variables.

Table 13: Summary statistics

Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the firms included in the KFS from 2004 till 2011. The four panels
classify the percentages of Firms, Duality, Independent board and leverage based on Panel A; Forms of
organizations, Panel B; Industry classification, Panel C; Survival rate and Panel D; Firm size.
Panel A : The Form of Organization
Sole
Prop.

LLC

C
Corp.

S
Corp.

Partnership
(Gen Part +
LTD part)

1635

1556

440

1039

206

Duality

7%

22%

34%

27%

65%

Independent board

18%

25%

24%

22%

78%

Leverage

28%

21%

25%

31%

63%

Firms

Panel B : Industry Classification
High Tech
Medium Tech

Low Tech

Firms

705

1329

2894

Duality

62%

43%

83%

Independent board

74%

55%

48%

Leverage

89%

76%

62%

Panel C : Survival Rate
Survived

Non-Survived

Firms

2007

2910

Duality

79%

43%

Independent board

56%

28%

Leverage

52%

67%

0 to 10,000

Panel D : Firm Size
10,000 to 100,000
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More than 100,000

Firms

40%

39%

21%

Duality

12%

22%

62%

Independent board

1%

23%

41%

Leverage

39%

83%

87%

To see the correlation between the EO factors and governance variables, we perform a pairwise
correlation matrix (table 4) presenting the correlation of the employed variables. Showing that
positive correlations exist between the governance variables and EO factors except for the risktaking variable which shows a negative correlation with other variables.

Table 14: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations

Table 4 shows the pairwise correlation between the study variables including; governance index,
innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness, ROE, ROA,
employment growth, sales growth, and industry.

Mean

1.

Variables

(SD)

Governance

4.46
(1.36)

Index
2.

3.

4.

5.

Innovativeness

Proactiveness

Risk-Taking

Competitive
Aggressiveness

6.

Autonomy

4.04
(1.31)
3.43
(1.25)
4.86
(1.24)
4.24
(1.28)

1

2

3

4

5

0.32*

0.23* 0.17*

− 0.52** 0.37* − 0.15**

0.53*

0.46*

0.44**

4.91
(1.30)

60

− 0.45

6

7

8

9

10

11

7.

ROE

0.35
(0.48)

0.17

0.14

8.

ROA

0.32
(0.47)

0.26*

0.14*

9.

Sales Growth

10. Employment
Growth
11. Industry

0.11
(0.32)

0.15*

0.48
(0.44)

0.57*

0.38
(0.36)

0.42*

0.11*

- 0.21*

0.02

- 0.24*

0.27** − 0.5* − 0.24**

0.37*

0.12* − 0.02*

− 0.26** − 0.08* − 0.24**

0.12** - 0.24** − 0.23*

− 0.08* − 0.13** 0.02* − 0.20* − 0.16**

0.04

0.02*

0.06

0.08

0.06*

0.09* − 0.11* 0.09

− 0.16

0.09

− 0.08** 0.04 0.26*

0.22* 0.52 − 0.28 − 0.50

5.2. Testing Hypotheses
We test our hypotheses in two principal steps. In the first step, we test the efficacy of
governance index in capturing the essence of EO factors. In the second step, we examine if the
governance index is capable of explaining cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in the
performance and survival length. (see table 2).
5.2.1. Governance and EO Factors
The first step involves using hierarchical regression analyses; Hierarchical
regression is a way to show if variables of interest explain a statistically significant amount of
variance in the dependent variable after accounting for all of the other variables. This is our
framework for the model comparison rather than a statistical method and requires building
several regression models by adding variables to a previous model at each step and later models
always including smaller models in previous steps. In many cases, our interest is to determine
whether newly added variables show a significant improvement in R2 (the proportion of
explained variance in dependent variable by the model).
Before performing hierarchical regression analyses, we follow the four steps
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recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the mediating role of EO in the relationship
between governance and performance/survival. Baron & Kenny's procedures describe the
analyses which are required for testing the various mediational hypothesis. The first step is to
show that the governance variables are correlated with the performance/survival. The second
step is to show that the governance variables are correlated with the EO dimensions. In other
words, we are treating the EO variables as the dependent variable. The third step involves
establishing the correlation between the EO variables and the performance/survival. In this step,
there is a correlation between the EO and the performance/survival variable because they both
are caused by the governance. In other words, in Baron & Kenny's procedures, the governance
must be controlled while establishing the correlation between the EO and performance/survival.
The last step in this procedure involves the establishment of the complete mediation across the
variables. This establishment can only be achieved if the effect of the governance over the
outcome variable while controlling for EO variables is positive. If all four steps of Baron &
Kenny's procedures are met, then the data is considered to be consistent with the mediational
hypothesis. If only the first three steps of Baron & Kenny's procedures are satisfied, then partial
mediation is observed in the data.
We first used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to reduce the dimensions of EO items,
based on the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. Each of the five dimensions of EO is
measured by three questions, so for each dimension a score by averaging the three questions is
calculated. The fit indexes of the first-order factors (i.e., the five dimensions) plus the secondorder factor (i.e., EO) fell within an acceptable range (χ2/df = 1.96, GFI = 0.93; CFI = 0.99, NFI =
0.96, AGFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.07). The standardized loading of innovation is 0.76* (t = 7.92), of
autonomy is 0.88** (t = 8.43), of proactiveness is 0.96*** (t = 9.38), of Competitive aggressiveness
is 0.72** (t = 7.54), and of risk-taking 0.62* (t = 7.22). All these indicate a satisfactory measurement
model.
Table 15: Hierarchical regression analyses results: effect of governance on entrepreneurial orientation (dependent

variable: EO dimensions)
Table 5 presents in 6 models the factors that affect each of the EO variables. Each model shows the
regression of the governance and control variables on each of EO variables as model 1 on the
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innovativeness, model 2 on the autonomy, model 3 on risk-taking, model 4 on proactiveness, model 5 on
competitive aggressiveness and model 6 on EO index.

Model (1)
Innovativeness

intercept
Ownership
Duality
Independent
board
Leverage
Industry

−10.998**
1.565**
0.086**
- 2.418***
−0.111**
1.469**

Model (2)
Autonomy

−11.619

Model
(3)
Risktaking
−8.821

Model (4)
Proactiveness

Model (5)
Competitive
Aggressiveness

−2.719

−13.947

3.672***

−0.240

4.716***

0.094

3.922***

−0.086

−0.099

−0.067

−0.083*

−0.096*

2.453*

2.517**

0.809

2.971***

2.993**

−0.245**

0.038

0.163

0.655**

−3.315***

0.067

−0.409***
3.867***

0.224

Model (6)
EO index

-1.223

1.314

Firm size

0.187

−0.009

0.278

0.072

0.220

−2.893*

Firm age

3.575

5.098*

1.388

−0.105

2.554

−1.768

F value

7.101

5.349

2.639*

4.346

3.898*

−2.710**

R2

0.209

0.342

0.260

0.420

0.190

.833

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Hypothesis H1 predicts that governance has a significant influence on innovativeness.
Counter to H1, the results in Table 5 (Model 1) indicate that innovativeness is significantly
positively related to the sole proprietorship ownership structure and the independent board. But
negatively related to duality and industry type. Hypothesis H2 suggests that there is a
relationship between governance and autonomy. The results in Table 5 (Model 2) provide support
for this hypothesis, indicating that autonomy is positively and significantly related to sole
proprietorship ownership structure and the independent board. While negatively related to
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leverage and industry type.
Hypothesis H3 predicts that there is a positive relationship between risk-taking and
governance. Counter to the hypothesis, the results in Table 5 (Model 3) indicates that risk-taking
increases significantly with board independency. H4 suggests that there is a significant
relationship between governance and proactiveness. This predication is fully supported by our
results (see Model 4, Table 5) as sole proprietorship tend to be positively related to proactiveness
and both leverage and industry type impacts proactiveness negatively. H5 argues that there is a
significant relationship between governance and competitive aggressiveness. This predication is
fully supported by our results (see Model 5, Table 5) as independent board tend to be positively
related to competitive aggressiveness, and negatively with duality.
In model 6 table 5, we regressed the governance factors on the EO index, and we got
positive significantly positive relation with single ownership, independent board and leverage,
while a significant negative relation with duality and firm size. In terms of R2, Model 6 seems to
have the highest goodness of fit of 83% as we included the five EO dimensions in the EO index
and regressed it on the governance variables. (Appendix 1).

5.2.2. Explaining Performance: Governance factors vs. EO factors
In terms of the empirical test of the relationship between EO and performance, results in
Table 14 (Model 1) indicate that EO factors have a significant and positive effect on performance;
as four of the EO dimensions tend to impact performance in a significantly and positively, while
risk-taking turn to impact performance in a significantly negative manner, these results provide
empirical support for how EO affects performance.
To explore possible mediating relationships between dimensions of the EO, Governance,
and performance, we conducted further analyses by separately adding both dimensions of EO
and variables of governance into Model 3. The final results are presented in Model 3 of Table 6.
The results show that 1) four of the five EO variables (Innovativeness, Autonomy, and Risk-
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Taking and proactiveness) have significant effects on performance; 2) both duality and leverage
as governance variables have significant effect on performance; 3) Firm size and firm age have
significant effect on performance; 4) adding EO to model 2 (Table 6 model 3) the estimated effects
of the five independent variables (EO) on performance are reduced (Model 3); 5) the estimated
effects of the Governance factors increased. These empirical results show that partial mediations
are supported by the data. Therefore, we concluded that EO partially mediates the relationship
between Governance and performance.
Table 16: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance

measured by ROE)
Table 6 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by ROE. Model 1 shows the EO
variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect on
ROE. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and
leverage) on ROE. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on ROE.
Model (1)
EO
1.28*

Model (2)
Governance
2.53**

Model (3)
EO + Governance
0.15

Ownership

0.22

0.24

Duality

.10**

0.11**

Independent board

.18***

0.06

Leverage
Innovativeness
Proactiveness

.12**
.23***
− 0.08**

0.01*
0.15***
− 0.07**

Risk-Taking
Competitive

− 0.01**
0.10 **

− 0.03***
0.09*

Autonomy

0.19 **

0.13*

Industry

0.05

.22***

0.49

Firm size
Firm age
F value
R2
Adjusted R2

0.09
0.10
12.10**
0.46
0.42

.16**
.02
11.23**
.73
.69

1.02***
− 0.19**
12.27***
.93
.91

Intercept

Aggressiveness

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

5.2.3. Explaining Survival: Governance factors vs. EO factors
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Table 7 gives an overview of all the relationships between all constructs used in the
research. Using LOGIT models with the survival of the startup as the dependent variables, results
show that; in the model (1) of the EO factors regressed on the survival, it shows that
innovativeness and proactiveness have a significant positive impact on survival, while both risktaking and competitiveness affect survival in a significantly negative way. The size and age of the
firm have significantly positive effects on its survival. The model variables explain 53% of the
startups' survival.
In model (2), the governance factors are regressed on the survival. Duality, independent
board, and leverage have a significantly positive impact on survival. The firm size and firm age
have positive effects on survival. Model (2) explains 66% of startup survival. On the combined
model (3) we regress both governance variables and EO factors on firm survival, the results show
that all the variables are positively significant affect startup survival, with the model explanation
of 93% of the survival.
Table 17: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of Governance and EO on Survival

Table 7 presents in 3 models the LOGIT regression of the factors that affect startup survival. Model 1 shows
the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect
on survival. Model 2 show the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and
leverage) on survival. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on survival.
Model (2)
Governance
1.04*

Model (3)
EO + Governance
0.79

Ownership

0.88

0.93*

Duality

0.30*

0.31**

Independent board

0.34**

0.35***

Leverage
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk-Taking
Competitive Aggressiveness
Autonomy

0.55**
0.58**
0.43**
- 0.26*
- 0.33**
0.36

0.56***
0.43***
0.28**
- 0.29**
- 0.35***
0.25*

Industry

0.37

0.38

0.33

Firm size

0.44**

0.46**

0.47***

Firm age
F value

0.28*
8.17*

0.29**
9.23**

0.30**
11.27***

Intercept

Model (1)
EO
1.01*

66

.53

R2

.66

.93

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

5.3. Robustness Check
For robustness check on the direct and indirect impact of governance factors on firm
performance, we used three other proxies for the performance: ROA (table 8); Sales growth (table
19); and employment growth (table 20). The results reported in table 8,9,10 supports the following
conclusions; All the EO factors have significant effects on performance; 2) Duality, leverage and
independent director as governance variables have significant effect on performance; 3) Firm size
and firm age have significant effect on performance; 4) adding EO to model 2 (table 8 model 3)
the estimated effects of the five independent variables (EO) on performance are reduced (Model
3); 5) the significance of the estimated effects of the Governance factors increased. These empirical
results with ROA - as a proxy for performance - show that partial mediations are supported by
the data. Which supports the result that EO partially mediated the relationship between
Governance and performance.
Table 18: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance

measured by ROA)
Table 8 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by ROA. Model 1 shows the EO
variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect on
ROA. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and
leverage) on ROA. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on ROA.
Model (2)
Governance
3.27*

Model (3)
EO + Governance
0.83

Ownership

0.46

0.97

Duality

0.25*

0.19**

Independent board

0.33*

0.21**

0.12**

0.08**
0.19**
- 0.11**
− 0.01***
- 0.05

Intercept

Leverage
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk-Taking
Competitive Aggressiveness

Model (1)
EO
2.13*

0.17***
0.12**
− 0.09**
0.15**
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Autonomy
Industry

0.16 **
0.12

0.14**

0.10**
0.32***

Firm size
Firm age
F value
R2

0.16*
0.11*
9.22**
0.40

0.18**
0.09*
8.24**
0.56

1.02***
0.06*
10.11**
0.89

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 19: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance

measured by Sales Growth)
Table 9 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by Sales Growth. Model 1 shows
the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect
on Sales Growth. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent
board and leverage) on Sales Growth. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance
variables on Sales Growth.
Model (2)
Governance
2.39

Model (3)
EO + Governance
0.98

Ownership

− 0.22

0.24

Duality

.10**

0.11*

Independent board

.18***

− 0.06

.12**

Intercept

Model (1)
EO
2.27

Leverage
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk-Taking
Competitive Aggressiveness
Autonomy
Industry

0.13
0.24*
− 0.02**
0.10 *
0.12 *
- 0.08

- .21**

0.01*
0.14*
0.30**
− 0.03***
0.32*
0.17*
- 0.27**

Firm size
Firm age
F value
R2

0.05*
- 0.11
7.22*
0.32

.22*
.09
11.23**
.43

.92**
- 0.14
8.51**
.75

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 20: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance

measured by Employment growth)
Table 10 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by Employment Growth. Model
1 shows the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive
aggressiveness) effect on Employment Growth. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables
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(ownership, duality, independent board and leverage) on Employment Growth. Model 3 shows the effect
of both EO variables and governance variables on Employment Growth.

Model (2)
Governance
1.22

Model (3)
EO + Governance
0.73

Ownership

− 0.17

0.24

Duality

.18**

0.11*

Independent board

.18***

− 0.06

Leverage
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk-Taking
Competitive Aggressiveness
Autonomy
Industry

.23**
.14***
0.09**
− 0.16**
0.14**
0.14 **
0.35

.36***

0.01*
0.15***
0.12**
− 0.18***
0.20
0.19**
0.44

Firm size
Firm age
F value
R2

0.63
0..22
8.10**
0.31

.33**
.39*
7.44*
.65

.91***
− 0.15**
9.32***
.85

Intercept

Model (1)
EO
1.93

While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

6. Discussion
The key objective of this study is to examine the mediating role of EO variables in the
relationship between Governance and performance; and survival. Our empirical results provide
support for the five hypotheses presented in the study. As predicted, including the EO factors
leads to superior performance. In addition, autonomy, innovativeness and competitive
aggressiveness are found to increase performance as predicted. While risk-taking and
proactiveness show a negative effect on performance.
In contrast to some of the current literature, our empirical results suggest that duality and
leverage has a significantly negative impact on EO factors. From results in Table 5, we find that
duality has the significant negative effect on innovation, proactiveness, risk-taking, autonomy
and competitive aggressiveness. The effect of duality seems to diminish when included in the
model of the indirect effect of it on performance through EO factors (model 3 table 6). Higher
leverage is associated with lower level of taking initiatives in innovation, autonomy and lower
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level of ability in identifying opportunities (proactiveness). On the other hand, surprisingly, our
results find that leverage is positively related to risk-taking, our main explanation for this
relationship is that the monitoring on most of the government loans and small business loans is
less restricted, allowing for the entrepreneurs to take the advantage of increasing the risk in a
hope to get higher returns and growth in return.
The empirical results also reveal some surprising results. Proactiveness is found to
negatively, not positively, affect performance. We offered some plausible explanation for the
surprising results. Although proactiveness leads to higher exposure for the firm products in the
market, it might lead to negative results if the firm takes it to more risky edges leading to product
failure thus lower performance. This finding implies that, in spite of product proactiveness
bringing a lot of positive benefits to the firms, it holds a lot of uncertainty and resource
consumption. Entrepreneurs should be cautioned on not emphasizing too much on proactiveness
because too much proactiveness will result in spending too much time in identifying
opportunities and taking unnecessary initiatives which increase the cost of the product and may
reduce its performance opportunities.
It is also surprising to find that risk-taking negatively, not positively, affects both
performance and survival. We posited that risk-taking might facilitate positive performance and
survival because resource commitment form top management allows product and process
designers to be less concerned with conserving resources needed to perform extra analyses and
redesigns (Chen et al., 2010). However, this perspective is not supported by our results. Risktaking seems to have a complex relationship with performance and survival. Although resource
commitment may facilitate performance temporarily, there may be negative results in the long
run when there is a strong proclivity for high-risk projects and aggressive postures to maximize
the probability of exploiting potential opportunities that may prompt firms venturing into the
unknown or borrowing heavily (Baird & Thomas, 1985).

7. Conclusion
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This study makes several contributions to the EO/governance literature, including the
following three. First, this research advances the entrepreneurial orientation literature by
examining the mediating role of EO in the relationship between governance and performance.
We find that EO significantly enhance the link between governance and performance. Although
the important role of innovative and entrepreneurial activities in the relationship of governance
and performance have been emphasized, insights regarding how EO dimensions intervene the
relationship between governance and performance are rare. Second, the mediating relationship
of EO between governance and survival is important because this finding challenges the general
idea that the relationship between governance structure and survival is simply direct. Although
governance might affect survival, mediating EO makes this effect more significant. Third, it solves
the debate of the subjectivisms of EO dimensions measured by questionnaires through mediating
them in the objective data of governance and performance opportunities and taking unnecessary
initiatives.
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Appendix 1
A.

EO Variables measurement in the KFS

Table 21: EO variables measurement

Table 11 presents the questions from the KFS used to measure each of the EO variables; innovativeness,
autonomy, risk taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness.

VARIABLE
Innovativeness

QUESTION
•
•
•

Autonomy

•

How many employees or owners, if any, were primarily responsible for research and
development.
Did your business introduce any products or services that were new or significantly
improved?
Was your business founded around a new or customized product or service that was
created by you or one of the founders of the business?
How many owners actively helped to run the business? By helped to run the business we
mean that they provided regular assistance or advice with day-to-day operations of the
business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating assistance.

Risk-taking

•

Financial (External Debt/Internal Debt)

Proactiveness

•

How many employees or owners, if any, were primarily responsible for executive
administration (strategic planning).

•

were any of the products or services new to any market or markets your business competes
in?

•

Did your business introduce any new or significantly improved processes in the production
of goods or providing services? Please include any new or improved processes, even if
your business was not the first to introduce it.

Competitive

•

Were any of the new or significantly improved products or services introduced in YYYY

•

new to [ITEM]? b) A national-wide market.
Does the company have a competitive advantage over its competitors? Yes 1, no 0

aggressiveness

B. Hierarchal regression models used in table (5):
INNOVATIONij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
AUTONOMYij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
RISKTAKINGij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
PROACTIVEij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
COMPETEij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
EO Indexij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij,
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